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TRIBAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL COOPERATION TO
ACHIEVE GOOD GOVERNANCE
Elizabeth Burleson*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Justice notes that, “[v]iolent
victimization among American Indians and Alaska Natives exceeds that
of other racial or ethnic subgroups by about 2.5 times the national
average.”1 Addressing jurisdictional uncertainty in a manner that
protects individuals and tribal integrity can help Native Americans
sustain their communities. Providing fair legal frameworks that are
enforced impartially is a basic function of any government. Good
governance is responsive to present and future societal needs in an
accountable, effective, transparent, equitable, and inclusive manner.
This article considers tribal, state, and federal cooperation to
achieve good governance. Part II discusses the patchwork of laws
affecting Indian country and analyzes the ways in which criminal
jurisdictional uncertainty affects native sovereignty and public safety.
Where the legal analysis does not depend upon the use of the term
“Indian,” the following discussion uses the term indigenous peoples.
Part III addresses civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in general and tribal
water quality regulation in particular. Management of natural resources
remains one of the core aspects of sovereignty that tribes have retained.
The section examines judicial recognition of tribal water rights to
prevent zinc mining in Wisconsin from impacting ancient wild rice
harvests of the Chippewa; to require non-Indians to adhere to water
* L.L.M., London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D., University of Connecticut
School of Law. Elizabeth Burleson has also written reports for UNICEF and UNESCO.
1. Carole Goldberg & Heather Valdez Singleton, Research in Brief: Public Law 280 and
Law Enforcement in Indian Country- Research Priorities, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., Dec. 2005, at 5
(citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 203097, AMERICAN INDIANS
AND CRIME: A BJS STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1992-2002, at iii, 4-6 (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/pdf/american_indians_and_crime.pdf).
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standards to reduce transboundary water pollution affecting the Flathead
Lake Reservation; and to protect ceremonial use of the Rio Grand River
by the Pueblo of New Mexico. Part IV considers homeland security in
the context of a devastating methamphetamine crisis among tribal
communities. Part V examines the need for public oversight when
regulation is devolved to the private sector. Part VI discusses
international law in relation to indigenous peoples. This section
addresses the domestic relevance of international human rights
provisions in protecting indigenous rights. Part VII assesses the prospect
for integrated management based upon comity and cooperation. This
section addresses equity concerns involved in natural resource
protection. Part VIII concludes that federal, state, and tribal entities can
enhance international and regional institutions in order to provide good
governance.
II. CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONAL UNCERTAINTY AND NATIVE
SOVEREIGNTY
Criminal jurisdiction is the area over which legal authority extends
to enforce laws or declare legal decisions. Distinguishing between tribal,
state, and federal criminal jurisdiction depends upon the location and the
nature of an offense.2 Identifying gaps and overlaps in jurisdiction also
involves a determination of the political status of suspects and victims as
Indian or non-Indian.3 Tribes have jurisdiction to punish crimes
committed by tribal members.4 Tribes do not have jurisdiction to punish
crimes by non-Indians.5 The United States government has been
2. Michael J. Bulzomi, Indian Tribal Sovereignty, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, June
2001, at 32, available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/june01leb.pdf.
3. The Supreme Court has recognized that the disparity in treatment between Indian and
non-Indians that occurs as a result of federal regulation of Indian affairs does not constitute an
impermissible racial classification. Instead, the distinction is based upon the political status of
Indians as a separate people. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645-647 (1977),
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to the Major Crimes Act following federal prosecution of an
Indian for the murder of a non-Indian on the reservation.)
4. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646
(1991), as recognized in United States v Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 197-98 (2004).
5. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978), superseded by statute on other
grounds, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646, as
recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. at 207. Oliphant eliminated tribal criminal jurisdiction over anyone
who is not a member of a federally recognized tribe. Id. at 195. As a result, tribes have been left
without jurisdiction to punish non-Indians who enter reservations and rape Native American
women. As Sarah Deer notes:
Since the Oliphant decision, tribal law enforcement and victim advocates report a large
increase in the number of non-Indian criminals attracted to Indian country because of
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conflicted regarding criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember Indians.6
A. Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
Judicial, executive, and legislative acts by the federal government
have had a profound impact upon native people in the United States. In
the Marshall Trilogy cases, the Supreme Court incorporated the
international colonial doctrine of discovery into United States law,7
divested tribes of foreign nation status,8 and recognized that States have
no power over Native American affairs.9 Non-native pressure for land
led President Andrew Jackson to require tribes east of the Mississippi to
be forcibly moved to Oklahoma in the Trail of Tears. Traditionally, the
federal government offered tribes a degree of protection from State
intervention. Yet, the Supreme Court has significantly restricted federal
recognition of tribal sovereignty.10 While Congress prohibited treaty
making with tribes in 1871,11 the legislative branch of the federal
government has been the most protective of tribal sovereignty. For
instance, when the Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina12 that tribes
this gap in jurisdiction. This is not limited to sexual predators. For example, there are
wide reports of methamphetamine labs, drug trafficking, and other crimes happening at a
large rate in Indian country.
Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and Federal
Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 462 (2005).
6. Non-member Indians are Indians that belong to tribes other than the tribe exerting
jurisdictional authority.
7. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Chief Justice Marshall
authorized the expropriation of Native American land that was discovered by colonial powers.
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: a Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal
Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 93 (1993).
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831). By calling tribes domestic
dependent nations, Chief Justice Marshall enabled Congress to lower Indian affairs from the sphere
of international law to domestic law. See Clinton, supra note 7, at 94-95.
9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001). Frank Pommersheim notes that Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia are popularly known as the Marshall trilogy. Frank
Pommersheim, Is There a (Little Or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?:
A Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 274 (2003). In these cases, the Court confronted basic
questions about the nature of Indian property rights: whether the Cherokee Nation was a “foreign
nation” capable of bringing an original action in the Supreme Court against the State of Georgia and
whether the laws of the State of Georgia (rather than the laws of the tribe) governed the actions of a
non-Indian within the Cherokee Nation Reservation. Id.
10. See Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 277 (referencing U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 38485 (1886) and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 533, 565 (1903)).
11. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 3, 16 Stat. 544, 570 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
12. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688 (1990) (reciting the facts that Duro was an enrolled
member of another Tribe and allegedly shot to death an Indian youth within the reservation’s
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lacked inherent sovereignty to exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians who committed crimes on their reservations, 13
Congress overturned this decision by statute.14 Recognizing that tribes
do have criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, Congress passed
what has come to be known as the Duro Fix as an amendment to the
1968 Indian Civil Rights Act.15 The Duro Fix restored tribal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by non-member Indians on a reservation.16
Indians who are enrolled members of any federally recognized tribe are
subject to the criminal jurisdiction of all tribes.17 Tribal criminal
jurisdiction is concurrent with federal jurisdiction.18
The Supreme Court has upheld Congress’ authority to enact the
Duro Fix. In United States v. Lara, the Supreme Court recognized that
Congress has constitutional authority to remove restrictions on tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians imposed by other
branches of the government.19 Philip Burnham notes that in Lara, ‘‘the
court yielded to Congress authority to determine the extent of inherent
sovereign power of Indian tribes under federal law.”20 Lara held that
boundaries), superseded by statute, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).
13. The Supreme Court held that “[i]n the area of criminal enforcement, . . . tribal power does
not extend beyond internal relations among members.” Duro, 495 U.S. at 688 (1990).
14. Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (amending Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077, 104
Stat. 1892 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1301) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
15. Id.
16. Tribal sovereignty includes the inherent power of Indian tribes to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000). Congress enacted the “Duro Fix,”
Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No 102-137, as an amendment to the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).
17. See United States v Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004) (citing 25 U.S.C. 1301(2)).
18. Tribal criminal jurisdiction may be concurrent with state criminal jurisdiction in a P.L.
280 state, now codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 P.L. 109-279). See
also Goldberg & Singleton, supra, note 1, at 7.
19. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199, 208-09 (finding that: (1) the source tribal jurisdiction to prosecute
defendant for violence to a policeman was inherent tribal sovereignty rather than delegated federal
authority; (2) Congress’ constitutional power allows Congress to remove limitations on tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians imposed by other branches of government; and (3)
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit federal prosecution of a defendant for assaulting a
federal officer after a tribe has prosecuted him for the same offense, without making the case that
tribal criminal jurisdiction derived from federally delegated power). In Lara, the tribe acted
pursuant to its inherent tribal power. Id.
20. Philip Burnham, Reading the Supreme Court, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 11 2005,
available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096410130. Lawrence R. Baca,
provides the following Lara analysis:
In United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), an Indian man who was a member of a
federally recognized tribe, but not the tribe on whose reservation he had been arrested for
violating tribal law, challenged the nature of the congressional action. During his arrest
by federal officers, Lara had assaulted one of them. After pleading guilty in tribal court
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inherent tribal sovereignty rather than delegated federal authority gave
the tribe criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians.21
The following federal statutes have an impact upon criminal
jurisdiction in Indian country. The General Crimes Act established
federal jurisdiction for all offenses committed by non-Indians upon
Indian victims and certain offenses committed by Indians upon nonIndian victims.22 The Major Crimes Act limits a tribe’s authority to
punish its own members for crimes by establishing federal jurisdiction
over Indians suspected of committing certain offenses in Indian
country.23 The majority of the listed crimes are felonies. The FBI has
criminal jurisdiction in “Indian country,” the official name for the
program. The number of federal prosecutors that regularly prosecute
rape cases in Indian country inadequately covers the 562 federally
recognized tribes that are scattered across 56 million acres of the
contiguous 48 States and millions of additional acres in Alaska.24 In
January 2006, Congress reauthorized the Violence Against Women Act

to assault on a police officer, Lara was further charged in federal court for assaulting a
federal officer. Lara challenged his conviction on double jeopardy grounds.
Lawrence R. Baca, Thirty Years of Federal Indian Law, 52 FED. LAW. 28, 35 (2005).
21. Lara did not address whether Native Americans as American citizens can be tried in
courts that do not follow United States Constitutional procedures. See Will Trachman, Tribal
Criminal Jurisdiction After U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro Fix, 93
CAL. L. REV. 847, 856 (2005). The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) limited tribal criminal
jurisdiction by imposing upon the tribes most of the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 tit. II, § 202, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West, Westlaw through 2006 P.L. 109-279).
The Constitution of the United States is the central focus of the Supreme Court, but as Saikrishna
Prakash notes:
Tribal sovereignty is not a product of the Constitution. Nor should we view tribal
sovereignty as emanating from federal statutes. Unlike cities and counties, tribes are not
the subunits of another sovereign. Instead, Indian tribal sovereignty is “primeval,”
predating the Constitution, and, indeed, the United States. In fact, the Constitution
presumes that the federal government would treat with Indian tribes, just as it presumes
that the federal government would treat with other nations generally.
Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1076 (2004).
22. General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (West, Westlaw through 2006 P.L. 109-279).
23. Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West, Westlaw through 2006 P.L. 109-279).
24. Goldberg & Singleton, supra note 1, at 4. Native Alaskan Villages are not part of Indian
country. Alaska Natives gave up aboriginal title in exchange for US $962.5 million and land
selection rights to forty-four million acres. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams Jr., The
Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the InterAmerican Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 68 (2001). While incorporation
allowed Alaska Natives to retain a degree of control over their natural resources, Native Alaskan
Villages have even less jurisdictional authority than Indian tribes. Id. Law enforcement in Alaska is
thus even more complex than in the continental United States. Id. See also Act of Dec. 18, 1971,
Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § § 1601-1628 (1988 & Supp. II
1990)); Clinton, supra note 7, at 78 (explaining Native American Census figures).
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through 2011.25 In doing so, Congress found that that “1 out of every 3
Indian (including Alaska Native) women are raped in their lifetimes.”26
Given that rape falls under the Major Crimes Act, tribes are dependent
upon federal agents to prosecute sexual assault cases. Since sexual
assault should be prosecuted pursuant to the Major Crimes Act, many
tribes lack sexual assault codes with which to prosecute rape cases when
the FBI declines to prosecute. Tribes that do have codes encounter
investigative obstacles that arise when more than a year has passed since
a crime has occurred. Irrespective of tribal codes, all tribes are under the
Indian Civil Rights Act obligation to limit prison terms to one year and
fines to $5,000.27
B. State Criminal Jurisdiction
States have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country over situations in
which both the victim and the suspect are non-Indian.28 Otherwise, states
do not have criminal jurisdiction in Indian country without express
authority such as that conferred by Congress in PL-280.29 State specific
25. Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). See also Ellen L. Buckwalter, Maria Perinetti, Susan L. Pollet
& Meredith S. Salvaggio, Modern Day Slavery In Our Own Backyard, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
& L. 403, 414 (2006).
26. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.). Section 904 authorizes a national baseline study to examine violence against Indian
women in Indian country. § 901, 119 Stat. at 3078-79. Section 905 permits “Indian law enforcement
agencies, in cases of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking, to enter
information into Federal criminal information databases and to obtain information from the
databases.’’ § 905, 119 Stat. at 3080. Section 906 funds grants to tribal governments to strengthen
tribal capacity to respond to domestic violence including: services to Indian women, prevention
strategies, and transitional housing for victims of domestic violence. § 906, 119 Stat. at 3080-82.
Wendy Boka notes that there are four times as many animal shelters than domestic violence shelters
in the United States. Wendy Boka, Domestic Violence in Farming Communities: Overcoming the
Unique Problems Posed by the Rural Setting, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 389, 397 (2004). England
established the first battered women’s shelter in 1970. Nichole Miras Mordini, Mandatory State
Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: an Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and
Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 307 (2004). The first such shelter in the United States opened in
1972. Id. By 1979, President Carter had created the Office of Domestic Violence to raise awareness
about domestic violence. Id.
27. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(7) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L. No,
109-279). Additionally, the Secretary of the Interior can create Courts of Indian Offenses, “CFR
Courts,” with authority comparable to those of a tribal court. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301(3), 1311
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-279); 25 C.F.R. § 11 (Law and Order on Indian
Reservations).
28. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
29. Enacted in 1953, Public Law No. 83-280 (“PL 280”) transferred Federal jurisdiction over
offenses involving Indians in Indian country to six States. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss2/1

6

Burleson: Cooperation to Achieve Good Governance
BURLESON

2007]

3/30/2007 12:50:08 PM

COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE GOOD GOVERNANCE

213

statutes such as PL-280 further complicate jurisdictional inquiries.30
Requiring that geographically-isolated tribes work with state and county
law enforcement agencies located over 100 miles away renders law
enforcement difficult. Initially enacted in the absence of tribal consent,
tribes have since gained the ability to retrocede from PL-280 upon state
agreement.31 The Indian Civil Rights Act amended PL-280 in a manner
that precludes states from assuming jurisdiction over Indian country
unless the affected tribes consented at specific elections called for that
purpose.32 The Department of Justice notes that, “States have returned
jurisdiction over nearly 30 tribes to the Federal government, thereby
reinstating tribal/federal responsibility for law enforcement.”33 The
enactment of and retrocession from state jurisdictional statutes require
the jurisdictional status of each tribe to be assessed individually.
C. Tribal-Federal and Tribal-State-Federal Concurrent Criminal
Jurisdiction
More than one sovereign can legally prosecute crimes that occur
within Indian country. The Department of Justice notes:
Most Federal and tribal justice systems that have addressed the issue of
concurrent tribal jurisdiction in PL 280 States have determined that
such jurisdiction exists. PL 280 contains no language removing tribal
jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this matter
either. But the Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Department of Justice,
concluded in 2000 that, “Indian tribes retain concurrent criminal
280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1162 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000)).
PL 280 offered other states the choice to gain such jurisdiction. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No.
83-280, 67 Stat. 588. The mandatory PL-280 jurisdictions are: Alaska, California, Minnesota
(except Red Lake reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except Warm Springs reservation), and
Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1360(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-467 (excluding
P.L. 109-415, 109-417, 109-432, 109-435, 109-461, 109-462)). In these jurisdictions, states have
jurisdiction over most misdemeanors and felonies and tribes have concurrent misdemeanor
jurisdiction. The federal government has divested jurisdiction and cannot prosecute most Indian
country crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a). On those reservations neither 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 nor 1153
apply. Other states, e.g., Kansas, Iowa, and New York, gained jurisdiction by different enactments.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3243 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-279) (Kansas); Act of June 30,
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-846, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa), and 25 U.S.C.A. § 232 (West, Westlaw through
2006 Pub. L. No. 109-279) (New York) (repealed by implication in Dalton v. Pataki, 780 N.Y.S. 2d
47). Concurrent federal government jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 may be
exercised in these states according to Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1993).
30. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3243; 25 U.S.C.A. § 232.
31. 25 U.S.C. §1323 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-279).
32. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-22, 1326 (West, Westlaw through 2006
Pub. L. No. 109-279).
33. Goldberg & Singleton, supra note 1, at 4.
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jurisdiction over Indians in PL 280 States.” 34

Concurrent jurisdiction can lead to a defendant’s undergoing two
trials for the same offense. In United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment
does not preclude the prosecution of a Major Crimes Act violation in
federal court after the same conduct has led to a tribal court prosecution
for violations of tribal law.35 Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Lara
that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not
preclude the prosecution of a non-member Indian in both federal and
tribal court for the same offense.36
D. Gaps in Criminal Jurisdiction and Homeland Security
Critical infrastructure lies within Indian country, the boundaries of
which are both national and international. Attorney General Ashcroft has
recognized that “[m]ore than 25 Indian tribes govern lands that are either
adjacent to borders or directly accessible by boat from the border. These
tribal lands encompass over 260 miles of international borders . . . .”37
Restoring public safety to Indian country requires cooperative networks
of law enforcement.38 President Bush has expressed the commitment to
work with the 562 federally recognized tribes on a government-togovernment basis, respecting tribal sovereignty.39 Government-to34. Id. at 7.
35. It remains to be determined whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits federal
prosecution following prosecution in a Court of Indian Offenses. See United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 327 n.26 (1978), superseded by statute on other grounds, Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Indians Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).
36. United States v Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 193 (2004).
37. The Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002: Hearing
Before the United States Committee on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Thomas B.
Heffelfinger, United States Attorney for the District of Minnesota) (citing Att’y Gen. Ashcroft)
[hereinafter Tribal Government Amendments] available at http://www.citizensalliance.org/
Major%20Issues/Supreme%20Court/The%20Hicks%20Fix/S.578/Heffelfinger%20Testimony.htm.
38. While tribes do not have clear criminal jurisdiction over non-Natives in Indian country,
tribes can establish cross-deputization agreements under which states delegate authority to tribal
officers to arrest non-Natives. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, “Indian Country” and
the Nature and Scope of Tribal Self-Government in Alaska, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 23 (2005).
39. Press Release, George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, Government-toGovernment Relationship with Tribal Governments, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive
Departments
and
Agencies
(Sept.
23,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-4.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is responsible for the effective management of 55.7 million
acres of trust land on behalf of Alaska Natives, American Indians, and Indian tribes. Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), available at http://www.doi.gov/bureau-indian-affairs.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2006).
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government relations involve a comity approach in which one sovereign
does not expect other judicial systems to be identical to its own, but does
expect proceedings to afford parties such basic due process provisions as
a full and fair trial before an impartial tribunal.
Tribal judicial power derives from inherent sovereignty, pre-dating
the federal Constitution.40 The Indian Civil Rights Act limited tribal
criminal jurisdiction by imposing upon the tribes most of the
requirements of the Bill of Rights,41 but tribal courts do not have to
abide by all of the Constitution’s due process requirements. Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor expressed concern that the ability of tribal
councils to remove judges limits the independence of tribal courts.42 She
welcomes the amendment of tribal constitutions to provide for formal
separation of powers.43 Many tribal governments do not mirror the
United States separation of powers system.44 Some tribes have
executive, legislative, and judicial branches that share power equally. In
contrast, the Pueblo tribes of New Mexico remain theocratic.45 Other
tribes are based upon the Indian Reorganization Act or the Oklahoma
Indian Welfare Act.46 Not all tribes have independent judicial branches,
and this complicates the process of balancing tribal sovereignty with
individual due process rights. In addition to separation of powers
concerns, the tribal criminal jurisdiction controversy involves such due
process provisions as indigent defense counsel. Tribal judicial systems
do not always provide free legal counsel for defendants who cannot
afford an attorney. Some tribes require individuals to be tribal members
before they can become jurors. This can impact a non-Indian defendant’s
due process rights to a jury of his or her peers. The Navajo Nation does
not have to grapple with this dilemma because non-Indians can be
selected in jury pools. Juries in the Navajo judicial system reflect a

40. See generally Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
41. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1301 et seq.
42. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33
TULSA L.J. 1, 5 (1997).
43. Id. A recent Navajo Supreme Court decision shows that tribes can designate non-members
as members for certain purposes. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal
Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. C.L. &
C.R. 1, 21 (2003).
44. O’Connor, supra note 42, at 5.
45. Cuarto Centenario, 1998 Proclamation All Indian Pueblo Council of New Mexico,
http://www.newmexicoculture.org/CuartoCentenario/indianproclamation.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2007).
46. Indian Reorganization Act or the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 461, et
seq. (West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-279); 25 U.S.C. § 503.
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cross-section of the community.47
The extension of tribal authority over non-Indians remains
controversial.48 The legislative attempt to fill this jurisdictional gap is
commonly called a “Hicks Fix,” referring to Nevada v. Hicks.49 In the
Hicks decision the Supreme Court found that a tribal court lacked
jurisdiction to hear a case in which a state police officer allegedly
conducted an illegal search on a tribal member’s home located within
the reservation.50 Justice Scalia wrote that states possess ‘inherent
jurisdiction’ over reservations, except where their authority is limited by
Congress.51 He also asserted that, “an Indian reservation is considered
part of the territory of the State.”52 It is important to keep in mind, as
Edwin Kneedler clarifies, that Nevada v. Hicks “rests on fairly narrow
grounds. It has to do with the interests of the state officer as the
defendant—not non-Indians generally, but a state officer who is
executing a warrant, carrying out a traditional state function.”53 Despite
47. George v. Navajo Tribe, 2 Navajo Rptr. 1 (1979); Navajo Nation Code tit. 7, § 654. See
also Tribal Government Amendments, supra note 37.
48. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for
Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 801 (2004).
49. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). See also Fletcher, supra note 48, at 801.
50. Fletcher, supra note 48, at 801. The Supreme Court held that the tribal court cannot
adjudicate tort claims that arise from state officials executing process on reservation lands when
seeking evidence for an off-reservation crime. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364 (reciting the fact that Hicks
was alleged to have shot a big horn sheep, protected under state law; it was later proven that the
sheep was not of a protected class). See Burnham, supra note 20.
Alex Tallchief Skibine provides a concise summary of Supreme Court tribal sovereignty
jurisprudence, noting:
In Oliphant, the Court held that tribes could not assume criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians. In Duro v Reina, the Court extended the Oliphant ruling to criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians. In Montana v. United States, the Court extended this line of
reasoning to civil jurisdiction over the activity of non-members on non-Indian fee lands,
but allowed for two potentially meaningful exceptions: when non-members have
consented to tribal jurisdiction, and when the activities of non-members have a serious
and direct impact on the health and welfare of the tribe, its political integrity, or its
economic security. In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, however, the Court severely limited, if
not eliminated, the second Montana exception. The Court found that the exception did
not allow the tribe to control the conduct of non-Indians driving on a state highway
running through the reservation. Finally, in Nevada v. Hicks, the Court extended the
Montana/Strate reasoning to cover non-member activities occurring on Indian owned
land. The Court held that the tribal court had no jurisdiction to hear a tort case brought
by a tribal member against state game wardens for wrongful acts which took place on
Indian land while these state officials were investigating a crime allegedly committed by
the plaintiff while he was off the reservation.
Skibine, supra note 43, at 16.
51. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365.
52. Id. at 361-62.
53. Edwin Kneedler, Indian Law in the Last Thirty Years: How Cases Get to the Supreme
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Justice Scalia’s state sovereignty dicta, Scalia admitted in a footnote that
“our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the
question of tribal-court jurisdiction over non-member defendants in
general.”54
Hicks exemplifies the degree of confusion that exists regarding
Indian law generally, and tribal criminal jurisdiction in particular.
Who decides? This question is at the core of well-functioning
societies. Governments must address efficiency, equity, security, and
sovereignty. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) oversight and management
has consumed a great deal of funding at the expense of measurable
benefits for Native Americans.55 Prakash points out that the power to
regulate commerce with tribes pursuant to the United States Constitution
does not extend to the power to regulate the tribes themselves.56 Prakash
goes on to note that,
in the United States’ eyes, India may seem weak; to India’s neighbors,
however, it may appear to be a formidable rival. Moreover, something
more than weakness and helplessness is necessary to justify plenary
power over persons and nations. Even where we might generally agree
that certain individuals are weak and helpless, such as the comatose . . .
the federal government does not have plenary power over all such
persons. Likewise, even if we generally agree that a nation, such as
Ethiopia, is frail and dependent, no one thinks that the United States
has a plenary power over Ethiopia or similarly situated countries.
Even if one accepted the dubious wardship theory, it cannot justify the
plenary power doctrine. To begin with, in order to justify the unbroken
exercise of plenary power since Kagama, one must conclude that every
Indian tribe has been continuously weak and helpless for the past
century. More importantly, to validate existing plenary power over all
Indian tribes, there must be some consensus that every Indian tribe is
weak and helpless. In an era where quite a few tribes run multi-million
dollar business enterprises, all this seems rather unlikely. The wardship
theory offers more of a feeble rationalization for plenary power than it
does a sound theory of constitutional law.57

Court and How They Are Briefed, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 274, 283 (2003-2004).
54. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2.
55. Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: from
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1266-67 (1995).
56. Prakash, supra note 21, at 1081.
57. Id. at 1103-04. See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886), in which the
Supreme Court asserted plenary federal power and upheld the constitutionality of the Major Crimes
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Crime occurs when societal structures are weakened as a result of
economic competition, social instability, and loss of cultural identity.
Cultural attrition erodes the social cohesiveness of unwritten systems of
tribal common law.58 Commitment to the rule of law and protection of
human rights requires institutions that are representative, legitimate, and
accountable. Divesting a people of dignity leads to a loss of respect. This
vulnerability in turn leads to a rise in violence. Restoring and
maintaining peace and security requires more than armed forces. It
requires cultural sensitivity and a commitment to supporting free and
representative tribal governments. In addition to training and fielding an
adequate police response, the United States must find a way to
coordinate public safety strategies among federal, state, and tribal
entities. An important first step in this process is to address jurisdictional
uncertainty in a manner that protects individuals and tribal integrity. The
Pueblo of New Mexico appear to be the only tribes that have succeeded
in clarifying tribal criminal jurisdiction.59 Perhaps the language
regarding the Pueblo in the Native American Omnibus Act of 2005 can
be used to pass broader tribal criminal jurisdiction legislation.60

Act based upon colonialist notion of the “white man’s burden” rather than the Indian Commerce
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Clinton, supra note 7, at 110-11.
58. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era Of Self-Determination: The Role
of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 294 (1996).
59. SEC. 104. INDIAN PUEBLO LAND ACT AMENDMENTS.
(a) IN GENERAL- The Act of June 7, 1924 (43 Stat. 636, chapter 331), is amended by
adding at the end the following:
SEC. 20. CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.
(a) IN GENERAL- Except as otherwise provided by Congress, jurisdiction over offenses
committed anywhere within the exterior boundaries of any grant from a prior sovereign,
as confirmed by Congress or the Court of Private Land Claims to a Pueblo Indian tribe
of New Mexico, shall be as provided in this section.
(b) JURISDICTION OF THE PUEBLO- The Pueblo has jurisdiction, as an act of the
Pueblos’ inherent power as an Indian tribe, over any offense committed by a member of
the Pueblo or of another Indian tribe, or by any other Indian-owned entity.
(c) JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES- The United States has jurisdiction
over any offense described in chapter 53 of title 18, United States Code, committed by or
against an Indian or any Indian-owned entity, or that involves any Indian property or
interest.
(d) JURISDICTION OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO- The State of New Mexico
shall have jurisdiction over any offense committed by a person who is not a member of
an Indian tribe, which offense is not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.’
S. 536, 109th Cong. § 104 (2005),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/F?c109:1:./temp/~c109xmPN1D:e8346:.
60. Native American Omnibus Act of 2005, S. 536, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.536.RS.
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III. CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS AND WATER RIGHTS
Often the political opposition to tribal jurisdiction over non-tribal
members is lower on reservations whose inhabitants are predominantly
tribal members. The Pueblo have been able to preserve both criminal and
civil jurisdiction, particularly with regard to water. In Montana v. United
States, the Supreme Court clarified that tribes retain authority over
internal relations and self-governance.61 The first Montana exception
recognizes that when non-Indians enter into consensual relationships
with a tribe or its members, the non-Indians consent to tribal
jurisdiction.62 The second Montana exception recognizes that tribes
retain authority over non-members that threaten or directly affect the
“political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the
tribe.”63 Water pollution directly affects tribal health and welfare.64 In
the wake of Supreme Court cases narrowing tribal sovereignty over nonmembers, the Court and agencies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) have looked for explicit grants of authority to tribes
rather than language that divests tribal authority.65

61. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
62. The Supreme Court’s first Montana exception states:
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
63. Id. at 566. The Court addressed the scope of the second Montana exception in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, and Strate v. A-1 Contractors. Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 438, 442-44 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
opinion) (holding the tribe has the authority to establish and enforce zoning regulation on the 3.1%
of land that is located within the reservation area from which the general public is prohibited that is
not owned by the tribe); id. at 458-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (same). The ability to exclude nonmembers impacts the tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction over non-members. Id. at 444-45. The Yakima
Nation lost the ability to regulate zoning within the area of the reservation that had lost its “Indian
character.” Anna Fleder & Darren J. Ranco, Tribal Environmental Sovereignty: Culturally
Appropriate Protection or Paternalism?, 19 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35, 38 (2004-2005).
See also Brendale, 492 U.S. at 447. Strate extends Montana to prohibit tribal court authority to
adjudicate a conflict between non-members arising from a traffic accident on a state highway within
the reservation. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (holding that tribes’
adjudicatory powers do not exceed their regulatory powers). The Court deemed the state highway
right-of-way equivalent to non-Indian fee land. Id. at 454-56. The inability to exclude non-members
precludes tribal court jurisdiction over non-members. Id.
64. See generally Wisconsin v EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 2001).
65. See id. (citing Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131)).
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A. The Clean Water Act and Tribal Jurisdiction
Congress passed the Clean Water Act to restore and maintain the
quality of the nation’s waters.66 In 1987 Congress amended the Clean
Water Act, authorizing tribes to enforce water quality standards.67 By
enacting Section 518 of the Clean Water Act, 68 the 1987 amendments
allowed the EPA to treat tribes as states for such purposes of the Act as
establishing and enforcing Water Quality Standards. Jessica Owley
states that, “Tribes have the ability to exercise meaningful jurisdiction
over their water quality because such jurisdiction fits within the
Montana exceptions and because the federal government has specifically
delegated authority to tribes.”69 This view is not universally held.
Opposed to an extension of tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction, states
have brought legal challenges against recognizing tribal water regulatory
authority under the Clean Water Act.70 Rather than recognizing a
delegation of federal authority to tribes based upon the text of the Clean
Water Act, the EPA has made a case-by-case decision regarding nonmember fee lands.71 In doing so, the EPA analyzes the impact of water
pollution upon each given tribe’s health or welfare.72 Each tribe must

66. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, 1251(a) (2000) [Clean
Water Act]. It precludes the discharge from a point source of any pollutant into the waters of the
United States without Clean Water Act compliance. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
67. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987) (codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2000)).
68. Section 518(e) of the Clean Water Act allows EPA to treat a tribe as a state, authorizing
tribes to establish their own water quality standards if:
(1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties
and powers;
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and
protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States
in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is
subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation; and
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator’s
judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the
terms and purposes of this chapter and of all applicable regulations.
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2000). See also Ann E. Tweedy, Using Plenary Power as a Sword: Tribal
Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act After United States V. Lara, 35 ENVTL. L.
471, 474-75 (2005).
69. Jessica Owley, Tribal Sovereignty Over Water Quality, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 61,
100-01 (2004).
70. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 744.
72. Id. at 748 (citing Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,878 (Dec. 12, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
131)).
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prove that the second Montana exception applies to their tribe in order to
obtain “treated in a manner similar to states” status.73 Prior to the EPA’s
recent change in terminology, the status was called “treated as states”;
the acronym remains TAS. Once treated in a manner similar to states,
the tribe may be able to place regulatory limitations upon water users
located upstream from tribal lands.74
Ann Tweedy notes that the Lara decision may reinvest tribal
sovereignty for tribes seeking TAS status under the Clean Water Act.75
This would lessen the burden of tribes by no longer requiring tribes to
prove that they retained sovereignty over water quality regulation.76
Prior to Lara, qualified tribes were eligible to regulate as if the tribe
were a state once they showed that their sovereignty had not been
divested.77 Rather than granting environmental regulatory authority to
tribes, the tribal amendments to the Clean Water Act acknowledged that
tribes already had inherent control over their water quality based on their
status as sovereign nations.78 This federal-tribal partnership to regulate
water allows tribes to set water standards that are more stringent than the
federal minimum standards.79
Ultimately, the EPA seeks to facilitate cooperative water-sharing
agreements among tribal, state, and federal entities involving watershed
management. The EPA identifies a watershed approach as a coordinated
management framework for “hydrologically-defined geographic areas,
taking into consideration both ground and surface water flow.”80
Watershed management, rather than political or member/non-member
classifications, offers the greatest likelihood of balancing human and
environmental concerns.81 While watershed management remains

73. Id.
74. Id. at 749.
75. Lara held that Congress could reinvest tribal criminal authority over non-member Indians.
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). See also Tweedy, supra note 68, at 473.
76. Tweedy, supra note 68, at 473.
77. Id. at 473.
78. Id. at 475.
79. Tsosie, supra note 58, at 234-35.
80. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, What is a Watershed Approach?,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework/ch2.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). The EPA
promotes partnerships among stakeholders, taking a geographic focus and relying upon sound
management techniques that are based on strong science and data. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Guiding Principles, http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framework/ch3.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2007). See also Paul M. Drucker, Wisconsin v. EPA: Tribal Empowerment and State
Powerlessness Under § 518(E) of the Clean Water Act, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 323, 392
(2002).
81. See Drucker, supra note 80, at 392.
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politically elusive,82 the following cases illustrate a judicial trend
towards recognizing a role for tribes in setting water standards.
B. Wild Rice in Wisconsin
In Wisconsin v. Environmental Protection Agency, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the EPA’s grant
of TAS status to a Chippewa tribe called the Mole Lake Band.83 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that,
[b]ecause the Band has demonstrated that its water resources are
essential to its survival, it was reasonable for the EPA, in line with the
purposes of the Clean Water Act and the principles of Montana, to
allow the tribe to regulate water quality on the reservation, even
though that power entails some authority over off-reservation
activities.”84

The Seventh Circuit noted that the rule in Hicks was not implicated
since Wisconsin v. Environmental Protection Agency did not concern
tribal control of state law enforcement authorities on the reservation
during the investigation of off-reservation crimes.85 Given plans to
construct a zinc-copper sulfide mine on the Wolf River,86 Wisconsin
argued that the tribe lacked jurisdiction since the state owned the
underlying lake beds pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine.87 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that even if this were the case, Congress’
Commerce Clause power to regulate navigable waters gave the EPA
authority to manage Clean Water Act programs on reservations.88 The
Seventh Circuit set a high bar for challenges to a grant of TAS status.89
The Mole Lake Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of the Sokaogon
Chippewa Community (SCC) state that the purpose of their water quality
standards is to “preserve and protect all things within the aquatic
ecosystem that support the cultural integrity, health, welfare, economic
security, environmental quality, safety, treaty rights and inherent
sovereignty of the SCC.”90 They specify that all tribal waters shall be
82. Id. at 392-93.
83. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 741 (7th Cir. 2001).
84. Id. at 750.
85. Id. at 748.
86. Id. at 745.
87. Id. at 746.
88. Id. at 747.
89. Drucker, supra note 80, at 362, 364.
90. SOKAOGON CHIPPEWA COMMUNITY WATER QUALITY STANDARDS § 151.01 (2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/chippewa_5_wqs.pdf.
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protected for cultural, subsistence, spiritual, medicinal, ceremonial, and
aesthetic purposes.91 They also note that their water quality standards do
not “abrogate independent tribal rights to sufficient quantities and
quality of water to support the flora, fauna, and cultural traditions of the
SCC.”92 Similarly, the Fond du Lac Band of the Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe lists cultural uses of water.93 Within this category they explain that
a wild rice area is “a stream, reach, lake or impoundment, or portion
thereof, presently, historically or with the potential to be vegetated with
wild rice.”94 Their aesthetic use of water “may include but is not limited
to primary (direct) contact with water or the preservation of wetlands for
the maintenance of traditional medicinal plants.”95
The Mole Lake Band relies upon Mole Lake, Bishop Lake, and
Rice Lake.96 The latter supports one of the only surviving wild rice beds
in Wisconsin.97 The Seventh Circuit notes that,
the Band is heavily reliant on the availability of the water resources
within the reservation for food, fresh water, medicines, and raw
materials. In particular, Rice Lake, the largest body of water on the
reservation, is a prime source of wild rice, which serves as a significant
dietary and economic resource for the Band. 98

Since none of the land within the reservation is under the control or
ownership of non-tribal members,99 the Seventh Circuit did not have to
worry about tribal limits upon regulating non-tribal members on fee
lands located within the reservation.
C. Montana v. Environmental Protection Agency
Jurisdiction over non-Indian fee lands was a factor in Montana v.
Environmental Protection Agency.100 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the EPA’s grant of TAS status in
the face of a challenge by landowners on the reservation who were

91. Id. § 151.11.
92. Id. § 151.02.
93. FOND DU LAC BAND OF LAKE SUPERIOR CHIPPEWA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS OF
THE FOND DU LAC RESERVATION, ORDINANCE NO. 12/98 ch. 3, § 302(e) (2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/chippewa.pdf.
94. Id. § 302(e)(1).
95. Id. § 302(e)(1).
96. Drucker, supra note 80, at 364.
97. Id.
98. Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2001).
99. Id. at 745.
100. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
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subject to the tribe’s water quality standards.101 An estimated 4,000
natural stream miles and 1,300 miles of irrigation canals and laterals are
within the 1.2 million acre reservation.102 The water policy of the
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes seeks to “preserve, protect and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the surface
waters and wetlands of the Flathead Reservation.”103 The water from
Flathead Lake supports agricultural, domestic, and industrial activities
within the reservation, a patchwork quilt of land owned by tribal and
non-tribal entities.104 This mixed use includes state, county, and
municipal pollution discharges on the reservation.105
The Ninth Circuit confirmed the EPA decision that the “activities of
the non-members posed such serious and substantial threats to tribal
health and welfare that tribal regulation was essential.”106 The Ninth
Circuit drew heavily upon the second exception established by Montana
v. United States.107 When non-Indian activity threatens the health or
welfare of the tribe, then tribes retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands.108 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished Montana v. Environmental Protection Agency from
Brendale by noting that the latter was a discrete zoning case while the
former concerns water pollution that can have broad ramifications.109
The district court noted that Justice White cited TAS status under the
Clean Water Act as an express Congressional delegation of tribal
regulatory authority over non-Indian lands.110 Given the mobile nature of
pollution, it is not feasible to manage water regulation based upon the
“member/non-member checkerboard.”111 The district court deferred to
101. Id. at 1141.
102. Montana v. EPA, 941 F.Supp. 945, 949 n.5 (D. Mont. 1996).
103. CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION,
SURFACE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS AND ANTIDEGRADATION POLICY ch. 1, pt. III, § 1.3.1
(1995),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/
salish_kootenai_8_wqs.pdf.
104. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1141.
107. See generally id.
108. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d
at 1140.
109. The district court recognized that “zoning impacts are normally discrete and localized,
whereas water pollution creates environmental health risks that may affect many people miles from
the source.” Montana v. EPA, 941 F.Supp. 945, 953 (D. Mont. 1996).
110. Montana v. EPA, 941 F.Supp. at 957 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428 (1989), to clarify that the decision does not overrule the
Montana exceptions).
111. Id. at 958.
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this EPA finding and agreed with the EPA’s decision to recognize tribal
jurisdiction over trust and fee lands.112 The Ninth Circuit agreed that the
tribe had water regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians pursuant to the
Clean Water Act.113
D. The Right of the Pueblo to Set High Water Quality Standards
In City of Albuquerque v. Browner, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the EPA correctly interpreted
Section 518 of the Clean Water Act to recognize tribal authority to adopt
water quality standards more stringent than federal standards and to
implement those standards even when upstream point sources are
located beyond tribal land.114 The Tenth Circuit recognized the right of
the Isleta Pueblo to regulate the City of Albuquerque’s waste treatment
plant.115 The plant was located five miles upstream from the
reservation.116 The Tenth Circuit determined that the EPA correctly
incorporated the Pueblo standards into a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit that was issued to the City’s waste
treatment facility.117 Water quality standards are a means by which the
desired condition of a given watercourse can be reached.118 Water
quality standards focus upon the desired character of the watercourse
rather than the pollutants.119 In contrast, uniform technology-based
standards focus directly upon such acts as curbing chemical
concentrations from point sources.120
The Tenth Circuit found that the EPA approval of the Pueblo’s
religiously-based “Primary Contact Ceremonial Standard” did not
contravene the Establishment Clause.121 The Isleta Pueblo’s WQS states,
“[p]ursuant to Section 518 of the Clean Water Act, the Tribal Council of
the Pueblo of Isleta, a federally-recognized Tribe of Indians, hereby
enacts the Pueblo of Isleta Surface Water Quality Standards . . . to
promote the social welfare and economic well-being of the Pueblo of
112. Id.
113. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1141.
114. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419, 422-24 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 965 (1997).
115. See id. at 423-24.
116. Id. at 419. See also Tweedy, supra note 68, at n.49.
117. Browner, 97 F.3d at 423-24. See also Brief of Federal Respondents at 11, Wisconsin v.
EPA, No. 01-1247 (S.Ct. May 3, 2002).
118. See Clean Water Act § 303; 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
119. Browner, 97 F.3d at 419 n.4.
120. See Clean Water Act §§ 301, 304; 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314.
121. Browner, 97 F.3d at 428-29.
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Isleta.”122 The tribe lists primary contact ceremonial use, as well as
fishing, agricultural, and wildlife usage of the Rio Grande.123 Primary
contact ceremonial use is the use of a stream, reach, lake, or
impoundment for religious or traditional purposes by members of the
PUEBLO OF ISLETA; such use involves immersion and intentional or
incidental ingestion of water, and it requires protection of sensitive and
valuable aquatic life and riparian habitat.124
Fleder and Ranco note that “[a]fter a session in the sweathouse,
tribal members bathe in the river.”125 They go on to explain that, “if a
person is hesitant to dance in ceremonies, he may be thrown into the
river briefly and then brought back to dance in wet clothes.”126 The
ceremony of the Corn groups involves chiefs washing their hands and
face in the river and praying.127 Spiritual practices followed by many
Pueblos seek to sustain harmony and bring weather that is favorable to
farming.128
The Isleta Pueblo’s town was established in the 1200s by
descendants of people who came to America an estimated 30,000 years
ago.129 The Sandia Mountains are no longer capped by glaciers and the
mammoths are long gone.130 The people survived, learning to work
communally to build sophisticated irrigation systems with which to
cultivate the arid land.131 Individuals and families had rights to use tribal
land and waters.132 By the 1st century A.D., they were growing beans,
corn, and squash.133 The prehistoric Anasazi peoples became the Pueblo.
These village-dwelling Indians of the southwestern United States
encompass (1) the Rio Grande Pueblos (2) the Hopi of northeastern
122. PUEBLO OF ISLETA, SURFACE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, TRIBAL RES. 92-14 §
I(A)(4) (1992), as amended by TRIBAL RES. 02-064 (2002), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes/isleta_6_wqs.pdf.
123. Id. at 15. See also Browner, 865 F.Supp. at 740.
124. PUEBLO OF ISLETA, SURFACE WATER QUALITY STANDARDS, TRIBAL RES. 92-14 § IV
(1992), as amended by TRIBAL RES. 02-064 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/
standards/wqslibrary/tribes/isleta_6_wqs.pdf.
125. Fleder & Ranco, supra note 63, at 53.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Scholastic,
Pueblo
(Indian
Tribes),
http://content.scholastic.com/browse/
article.jsp?id=5046 (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
129. The History of the Pueblo of Isleta, http://www.isletapueblo.com/history.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2006).
130. Id.
131. Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism
Succeed?, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 769 (2001).
132. Id.
133. The History of the Pueblo Isleta, supra note 129.
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Arizona, and (3) the Zuni of western New Mexico. Pueblo geographic
isolation and a tradition of resistance facilitated greater cultural
preservation than was achieved by any other tribe in the United States.
The Isleta do not dwell on an island, but their tongue of land does jet out
into the Rio Grande River, prompting the Spanish to call them Isleta
(little island).134 While willing to sell blue corn tortilla chips, the Isleta
Pueblo remain an “island town,” culturally committed to the Rio Grande
Pueblos tradition of resistance to assimilation.135 Pueblo standards make
up nine out of twenty-eight of the EPA-approved tribal water quality
standards.136 The EPA notes that “(t)ribal reservations without approved
water quality standards account for as much land area as all of New

134. “The Eastern Pueblos include the peoples of Acoma and Laguna, in the high plateaus of
west central New Mexico, as well as along the Rio Grande, including the villages of Taos, Isleta,
Jemez, Nambé, Picurís, Pojoaque, Santa Clara, San Ildefonso, San Juan, Sandia, and Tesuque.”
Scholastic, supra note 128.
135. The History of the Pueblo of Isleta, supra note 129. See also Scholastic, supra note 128.
136. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Tribal Water Quality Standards Approved by
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/standards/wqslibrary/tribes.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
The following list is arranged by region.
Region 4 consists of: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Tennessee. Id. The Seminole of Florida and Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Florida are the only region 4 tribes to have gained EPA approval of Water
Quality Standards. Id.
Region 5 consists of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Id.
The following Region 5 tribes have obtained approval from the EPA: Mole Lake Band
of the Lake Superior Tribe of the Chippewa Indians, Sokaogon Chippewa Community,
The Fond du Lac Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, and Grand Portage Band of
the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe. Id.
Region 6 consists of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Id. The
following Pueblo tribes have been the only tribes in region 6 to receive EPA approval:
Pueblo of Acoma, Pueblo of Isleta, Pueblo of Nambe, Pueblo of Picuris, Pueblo of
Pojoaque, Pueblo of Sandia, Pueblo of San Juan, Pueblo of Santa Clara, and Pueblo of
Tesuque. Id.
Region 8 consists of Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming. Id. The following region 8 tribes have achieved EPA approval: Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation, and Assiniboine and
Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. Id.
Region 9 consists of Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, and Pacific Islands. Id. The
following region 9 tribes have gained EPA approval: White Mountain Apache, Hoopa
Valley Tribe, Hualapai Tribe, and Navajo Nation. Id.
Region 10 consists of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. Id. The following region
10 tribes have obtained EPA approval: Kalispel Indian Community of the Kalispel
Reservation, Spokane Tribe of Indians, Puyallup Tribe of Indians, Confederated Tribes
of the Chehalis Reservation, Federal Water Quality Standards Regulations for the
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation of Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian
Reservation of Oregon, and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe. Id.
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England plus the State of New Jersey.” 137 There remain roughly 52,000
bodies of water that are polluted beyond their “total maximum daily
loads” of pollutants.138 The EPA has proposed allowing financially
strapped rural communities to have lower drinking water standards for
toxins such as arsenic vis a vis the rest of the United States.139
Based on the designated use of the waterway, the Clean Water Act
water quality standards convey the desired state of a given waterway.140
This gives tribes an opportunity to establish and enforce high water
quality standards.141 A criminal violation of the Clean Water Act may
subject non-Indian defendants that are charged with polluting water that
flows through tribal land to fewer due process provisions than are
available under the United States Constitution.142
The Isleta Pueblo note that “Isleta’s current population is more than
4,000, of which about 2,500 are tribal members. A person must be at
least 50% pure Isleta blood in order to be eligible for tribal
membership.”143 Balancing tribal sovereignty and individual due process
rights becomes increasingly challenging as modern life overwhelms
traditional cultures. For instance, ten percent of the Isleta Pueblo
community has been exposed to the drug methamphetamine, prompting
the tribe to redirect resources to establish a comprehensive plan
encompassing emergency department, health education, mental health,
addiction treatment, primary care, and environmental health services.144

137. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM DRAFT 1-29-04, INTERIM DRAFT
OUTREACH AND CONSULTATION PLAN, FEDERAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR WATER IN
INDIAN COUNTRY 1 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/standards/tribal/2004outreachconsultationplan-1-29.pdf. See also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as
State: The Penobscot Indians and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 825 (2004).
138. Daniel McCool, The River Commons: a New Era in U.S. Water Policy, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1903, 1925 (2005).
139. Juliet Eilperin, EPA May Weaken Rule on Water Quality, Plan Would Affect Towns That
Find Complying Costly, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at A04, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/31/AR2006033101629.html?nav=r
ss_politics.
140. Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 419 n.4 (10th Cir.1996) (summarizing 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1311, 1314).
141. Montana v EPA, 941 F.Supp. 945, 958 (D. Mont. 1996).
142. Trachman, supra note 21, at 859.
143. The History of the Pueblo Isleta, supra note 129.
144. Oversight Hearing on the Problem of Methamphetamine in Indian Country: Hearing
Before United States Senate Comm. On Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 7 (2006) (statement of Jefferson
Keel, First Vice President, National Cong. Of American Indians) [hereinafter Keel Statement],
available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Keel040506.pdf.
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IV. METHAMPHETAMINE CRISIS AMONG TRIBAL COMMUNITIES
Tribes are responding to the threat of methamphetamine (“meth”)
to tribal members, homes and aquatic habitat by enacting strict tribal
anti-methamphetamine criminal codes.145 Tribes are exercising their
sovereign right to banish meth dealers and are promoting cooperative
tribal criminal jurisdiction, inter-jurisdictional task forces,
memorandums of understanding, and family courts.146 Drug cartels are
targeting tribal communities, taking advantage of jurisdictional gaps
between criminal justice systems.147 Al-Qaeda found Afghanistan’s lack
of a legal system conducive to terrorist training. On a smaller scale,
organized crime has infiltrated Indian country, recognizing that the
patchwork of criminal jurisdiction insulates criminal activity. Homeland
Security requires integrated communication and reporting among tribal,
state, and federal entities.148 At the signing ceremony for the USA
Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,149 President Bush
pointed out that the Act “places limits on large-scale purchases of overthe-counter drugs that are used to manufacture meth. It requires stores to
keep these ingredients behind the counter or in locked display cases. The
bill also increases penalties for smuggling and selling of meth.”150
Noting that meth is easy to make and highly addictive, President Bush
explained that the act would make many of the ingredients used in
manufacturing meth harder to obtain in bulk and easier for law
enforcement to track.151
On March 17, 2006, the United Nations Commission on Narcotic
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id. at 1-2.
148. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. L.
No. 109-279) (as amended by section 7402 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458)). To this end, several senators have introduced bills to facilitate
tribal involvement in home land security. S. 477 would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002
to include Indian tribes among the entities consulted with respect to activities carried out by the
Secretary of Homeland Security. S. 477, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c109:S.477.IS:. S. 1374 would amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to provide
for a border preparedness pilot program on Indian land. S. 1374, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.1374.PCS:.
149. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120
Stat. 192 (2006). See also Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections in numerous titles of U.S.C.).
150. Press Release, The White House, President Signs USA Patriot Improvement and
Reauthorization Act (Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/03/20060309-4.html.
151. Id.
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Drugs adopted a resolution on precursor chemicals used to make
synthetic drugs.152 The resolution calls upon states to make available to
the International Narcotics Control Board annual approximations of the
country’s legitimate use of such chemicals as pseudoephedrine.153 The
resolution also calls upon states to equilibrate imports of such chemicals
with legitimate uses.154 Super labs must acquire large quantities of
pseudoephedrine to produce meth.155 Pseudoephedrine is an ingredient in
many over-the-counter and prescription products.156 Based upon drug
and lab seizure statistics, approximately eighty percent of the meth used
in the United States is produced in Mexican super labs.”157 The Tohono
O’Odham Indian Reservation borders Mexico for approximately 70
miles.158 It is the second largest reservation in the United States and has
become a critical drug corridor for Mexican traffickers.159
152. Press Release, Office of National Drug Control Policy, United Nations Body Agrees to
Strengthen Systems for International Control of Precursor Chemicals (Mar. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press06/031706.html.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also Crystal Meth to be Class A Drug, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/5079266.stm (“Crystal Meth is to be reclassified as one
of the UK’s most dangerous drugs alongside cocaine and heroin, the government has announced.
Drugs Minister Vernon Coaker said the drug, also known as methamphetamine, is to move from
class B to class A”); John Leland, Meth Users, Attuned to Detail, Add Another Habit: ID Theft,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/11/us/
11meth.html?ex=1310270400&en=6df49385bf828429&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (“While
public concern about identity theft has largely focused on elaborate computer schemes, for law
enforcement officials in Denver and other Western areas, meth users have become the everyday face
of identity theft . . . . because the drug has a long high, addicts have patience and energy for crimes
that take several steps to pay off.”); Oregon Meth Law Requires Prescription for Cold Meds, NPR,
July
1,
2006,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=5527039&ft=1&f=1001 (“A new law takes effect in Oregon that requires cold
medicines containing pseudoephedrine, like Sudafed and Claritin D, to be sold only with a
prescription. Pseudoephedrine is used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine.”); US Warns of
‘Global
Meth
Threat,’
BBC
NEWS,
May
10,
2006,
available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4757179.stm.
155. Combating Methamphetamine In Indian Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On
Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Matthew H. Mead, United States Attorney of the
District
of
Wyoming)
[hereinafter
Mead
Statement],
available
at
http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Mead040506.pdf.
156. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, ONDCP FACTSHEET: EFFORTS TO
CONTROL PRECURSOR CHEMICALS (2006), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/international/factsht/eff_contr_precursr_chem.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2006).
157. Mead Statement, supra note 155, at 2.
158. Id. at 4.
159. Id.
In the United States, there are 562 federally recognized tribes, residing on 281
reservations within 34 different states. Sixty-one reservations are within 50 miles of
either the U.S.-Canada border or the U.S.-Mexico border. Because of the sovereign
status of the tribes, they are generally not subject to state jurisdiction, except where
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The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicates that “prolonged
drought, population growth, and outmoded practices and infrastructure
in the border region strains water-sharing arrangements with Mexico; the
U.S. has stepped up efforts to stem nationals from Mexico, Central
America, and other parts of the world from crossing illegally into the
U.S. from Mexico . . .”160 According to the CIA, the United States is a
consumer of meth from Mexico, as well as an illicit producer of meth.161
Felicia Fonseca of the Associated Press reports, “Law-enforcement
officials believe the meth is coming from Phoenix and Mexico, and say
it is particularly hard to stop on the huge reservation, which covers
27,000 square miles in Arizona, New Mexico and Utah and is plagued
by a shortage of police officers.”162 International drug traffickers are
taking the route of least resistance and are well aware of criminal
jurisdictional uncertainty in Indian country.
The Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has testified to
the Senate that “meth is fueling homicides, aggravated assaults, rape,
child abuse, and other violent crimes.”163 He explained that meth is a
highly addictive synthetic central nervous system stimulant that creates
intense euphoric highs.164 Robert McSwain of the Department of Health
and Human Services testified that as many females use meth as males.165
While the heaviest use of meth is occurring among people between the
ages of 25 to 34, meth use among children and the elderly is alarming.166
Meth causes violent behavior and paranoia.167 McSwain calls for
Public Law 280 applies. As a result, local law enforcement often has no jurisdiction in
Indian country, and tribal law enforcement agencies bear the burden of most law
enforcement functions. The ratio of law enforcement personnel to residents on tribal
lands is far lower than in non-tribal areas.
Id. at 3.
160. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: UNITED STATES (2006)
[hereinafter
CIA
WORLD
FACTBOOK:
U.S.],
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2006).
161. Id.
162. Felicia Fonseca, ‘Devil’s Drug’ Meth Rotting Navajo Lives, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Apr. 15,
2006, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/news/124756.
163. Problem of Methamphetamine Use in Indian country: Hearing Before the Comm. On
Indian Affairs, 109th Cong.1 (2006) (statement of William P. Ragsdale, Director, Bureau of Indian
Affairs), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Ragsdale040506.pdf.
164. Id.
165. The Problem of Methamphetamine in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
On Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement of Robert McSwain, Deputy Director, Indian
Health
Service)
[hereinafter
McSwain
Statement],
available
at
http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/McSwain040506.pdf.
166. Id.
167. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, ONDCP FACTSHEET: COUNTERING THE
SPREAD OF SYNTHETIC DRUGS (2006) [hereinafter ONDCP, COUNTERING SYNTHETIC DRUGS],
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“coordinated and collaborative responses from federal, tribal, state, and
private agencies.”168 First synthesized in 1919, meth was administered to
troops during the Second World War as a stimulant.169 Commonly called
crystal or speed, meth has become the drug of choice for many
Americans. Montana has launched a large-scale anti-meth public health
campaign.170 Dr. John Nautts of the West Montana Addiction Services
explains that people who stop using meth often experience severe
depression. There is a severe shortage of residential chemical
dependency treatment facilities in Indian country.171 In the same manner
that adrenalin releases high levels of the neurotransmitter dopamine,
meth sharply stimulates the central nervous system. Meth addicts
become dependent on highly stimulated thought processes. Damaged
neuro-transmitters leave meth users with a reduced capacity to feel
pleasure.172 In February 2006, U.S. Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) introduced a bill to increase counseling
and suicide-prevention materials for rural tribal communities that are
experiencing teenage suicide rates up to 10 times the national average.173
Jefferson Keel of the National Congress of American Indians
testified that
[Meth] is not only poisoning our souls, minds and bodies, but the

available
at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/international/factsht/
counter_synth_drg.html (last updated Aug. 3, 2006).
168. McSwain Statement, supra note 165, at 9.
169. ONDCP, COUNTERING SYNTHETIC DRUGS, supra note 167.
170. See Montana Meth Project, http://www.montanameth.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
171. The Proble of Methamphetamine in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
On Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement of Ivan D. Posey, Chairman of the Eastern
Shoshone
Business
Council)
available
at
http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Posey040506.pdf. Ivan Posey notes:
[T]he need for more prevention programs that can be offered through our Boys and Girls
Clubs or other youth organizations. There is also a place for this at our Senior Citizens
programs. We need to continue to educate at all age levels and strongly push the
negative affects of this drug. We also need to look at long term treatment facilities in
areas such as ours which are in rural settings which makes us send our loved ones to
other states to receive treatment. The emphasis needs to be Prevention, Education, and
Treatment. Unfortunately, those caught in the middle are subject to our law enforcement
and judicial systems.
Id. at 6.
172. Meth affects memory and word recall as well as emotional stability. Andrew Buncombe,
Drug Dependency in the US: The Crystal Craze, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 21, 2006, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article359121.ece.
173. Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Dorgan Calls for More
Investment
in
American
Indian
Education
(Mar.
23,
2006),
available
at
http://indian.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=15&
Month=3&Year=2006.
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highly toxic meth labs are irreversibly poisoning our homes, our lands,
and our water supplies; and stretching those who serve us, our law
enforcement officials, our public works staff, and our child protective
services workers to the breaking point.174

There are no proven safe levels of meth residue.175 Meth can be
made from common household products in small toxic labs.176 John
Walters notes, “The production of one pound of meth releases poisonous
gas into the atmosphere and creates 5 to 7 pounds of toxic waste. Many
laboratory operators dump the toxic waste down household drains, in
fields and yards, or on rural roads.”177 These labs and heavy meth use
contaminate homes, requiring decontamination at an average cost of
$10,000.178
V. PUBLIC OVERSIGHT AND DEVOLUTION TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Without transparency, civil society struggles to hold public and
private sectors accountable for preserving the public trust. Without trust,
tangible natural resources vanish. Some re-emerge as specters, once able
to heal but transformed into threats to body and soul. Medicine marketed
to help people breathe becomes a catchy monosyllabic substance with
which to stop breathing altogether. Medicating boredom is a dangerous
game. Feeding desperation with chemical dependency is lethal. Drug
production and use thrives in states destabilized by rapid wealth or
poverty. Such change goes to the heads of individuals whose
communities struggle to retain social cohesion and economic stability.
Cashing in natural resources alters traditional notions of value and
welfare. Sustainable development becomes a term with which people
can converse without finding middle ground. Consensus building makes
way for political expediency.
Guns cannot win the war on drugs since the supply of mind-altering
substances fluctuates with the economic disparity between peoples. The
demand for addictive chemicals has the same origin. Fortresses often fall
174. Keel Statement, supra note 144, at 2. Jefferson Keel notes that the “lack of adequate law
enforcement resources, difficult jurisdictional issues, historical struggles with addiction, limited
governmental resources, and all of the complexities that come with poverty have made Indian
reservations a target by external drug traffickers and disproportionately vulnerable to all aspects of
methamphetamine from manufacturing to abuse.” Id. at 1.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Mead Statement, supra note 155, at 2.
177. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, FACTS & FIGURES: METHAMPHETAMINE
(2006), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/methamphetamine/ (last
updated Jan. 9, 2007).
178. Keel Statement, supra note 144, at 2.
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to the most desperate. Immigration and illicit drugs are the topics of the
day. Often discussions of indigenous title are not taken seriously in
decision-making forums. Yet, South America is uniting. Control over
natural resources is at the core of this development. Venezuelan oil
politics are headline news,179 as is Bolivia’s suspension of coca
eradication programs.180 Bolivians have endured nearly 200 coups and
countercoups since gaining independence from Spain in 1825.181
Electing an indigenous head of state in December 2005, Bolivians seek
to address the country’s severe poverty.182
Corporations can invest in infrastructure but do not always make
distribution decisions based upon vital human need.183 Privatization of
water brings into question the public service role of government to make
water available on the basis of public interest. Faced with aging
infrastructure, city officials of Cochabamba, Bolivia privatized water
distribution in 1999.184 Hundreds of thousands of ordinary Bolivians
joined street protests when water prices rose far beyond the capacity
with which most citizens could pay their water bills.185 The government
was forced to break its contract with Bechtel subsidiary, Aguas del
Tunmari.186 Similar civil unrest occurring in El Alto, Bolivia in January
2005 led President Carlos Mesa to rescind the contract with the Suez

179. Venezuela Gives US Cheap Oil Deal, BBC NEWS, Nov. 23, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4461946.stm.
180. For a discussion of the recent coca controversy in Bolivia see Becky Branford, Coca
Quandary for Hard-up Bolivia, BBC NEWS, Apr. 14, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4902192.stm.
181. Bolivia is the world’s third-largest coca producer after Colombia and Peru. CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: BOLIVIA (2006), available at
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bl.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2006). Coca
cultivation is gaining momentum, increasing by eight percent from 2004 to 2005. Id.
182. Daniel Schweimler, Bolivia Unveils Anti-Poverty Plan, BBC NEWS, June 17, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5090850.stm (explaining that funding for increased
access to clean water will come from proceeds from the recently nationalized gas industry as well as
foreign investment and international lending). See also Bolivia ‘Won’t Pay Compensation,’ BBC
NEWS, May 11, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4760525.stm (explaining that
Bolivia wants to use its energy revenues to finance national growth). The article explains,
“Bolivia’s President Evo Morales has said that foreign energy firms should not expect compensation
for assets that are now under state control.”
183. Advocates of market liberalism seek to maximize value, leaving distributive equity to
separate tax and transfer programs. Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2132 (2005). In response, sustainable development advocates
point out that subsequent corrective devices stigmatize equity as a cost. Id.
184. Jason Astle, Comment, Between the Market and the Commons: Ensuring the Right to
Water in Rural Communities, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 585, 589 (2005).
185. Id.
186. Id.
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subsidiary, Aguas del Illimani.187 It remains a formidable challenge to
bring water across the Andes Mountains to remote villages. Whether
market driven pricing is augmented by water subsidies for the poor or
some other regulatory oversight occurs, water availability must be
recognized as not only a need but a human right.188
Public distribution of water does not guarantee efficiency or
equity.189 In the United States, Reclamation Bureau water policies have
led to growing high water, low-value crops such as hay and alfalfa in
water-stressed areas.190 Daniel McCool notes that,
[t]hese programs allocated most of their money to a small number of
large corporate farming operations. A recent USDA study found that
59% of government payments went to producers with a net worth of
$600,000 or more. A report by the Environmental Working Group
also found that subsidies tended to concentrate in a few very large
corporate recipients. For example, the top 10% of corn
subsidy
recipients received 72% of the corn money; the top 10% of cotton
subsidy recipients took in 80% of that money. 191

McCool goes on to point out that overproducing crops has
overdrawn groundwater resources such as the Ogallala Aquifer, located
under the Great Plains.192 Spanning from Canada to Texas, this aquifer is
being drawn down at a rate that is three to four times more rapid than the
rate at which it is being recharged.193
The public expects governmental control to be transparent, ensuring
that managers remain accountable to the people. Governments and
private companies are both capable of upgrading infrastructure. They are
also both susceptible to corruption. The Cobell litigation over Indian
187. Id. at 589-90. Robert Glennon notes:
In 1998, the World Bank insisted that the Bolivian government turn over its public water
utility to the private sector, or else the Bank would refuse to guarantee a $25 million loan
for improvement of the water system infrastructure. The Bank required that
infrastructure costs be passed on to consumers. At the instruction of the Bank, the
company that received the concession, a subsidiary of the Bechtel Corporation, increased
water rates by 35%. A series of escalating protests resulted in seven deaths and spurred
Bolivian President Hugo Banzer to place the country under martial law.
Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1890 (2005).
See also David H. Getches, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Water Under International Norms, 16
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 259, 269-70 (2005).
188. Astle, supra note 184, at 596.
189. McCool, supra note 138, at 1912.
190. Id. at 1913.
191. Furthermore, roughly half of the land that is irrigated in the United States is done so using
a flood-irrigation method. Id. at 1914. This is very inefficient vis a vis drip irrigation. Id.
192. Id. at 1915.
193. Id.
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Trust assets194 and the controversy over who should control port
security195 highlight the complexities of ensuring competent governance.
Given the cost of oversight, privatization may not be cost-effective. Civil
society continues to challenge a lack of transparency in the use of private
contractors, be they Suez in Bolivia or Halliburton in Iraq.196 “Early in
the Iraq war, several companies of soldiers found themselves in
particularly dangerous parts of Iraq without food or fresh water, because
the contractors in charge of supplying provisions were unable to fulfill
their contracts.”197 The Pentagon has been investigating allegations by
Halliburton water personnel that the corporation threatened troops in
Iraq by not treating water.198 The Iraq Water Quality Manager for
Halliburton’s Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) subsidiary reported that
KBR’s water service depended upon employees that the company paid
as unskilled workers and recognized as semiskilled labor.199 Lack of
training and records led to prolonged exposure to contaminated water.200
KBR collected Euphrates River water less than a mile downstream from
a raw sewage outlet.201 The non-potable water provided to troops was
194. Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See also Press Release, U.S. Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, McCain and Dorgan Call For Action Following Cobell v.
Kempthorne Decision (July 18, 2006), available at http://indian.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=17&Month=7&Year=2006.
“[A]lthough removal of Judge Lamberth from the Cobell case may be a moral victory for the
government attorneys, the decision in no way diminishes the government’s underlying liability to
hundreds of thousands of individual Indians.” Dorgan pointed out that the Circuit Court reaffirmed
that Interior’s record in acting as trustee to these Indians is ‘deplorable’ and ‘deserves condemnation
in the strongest terms.’ Id. (quoting Vice Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
Senator Dorgan).
195. Dana Milbank, On Immigration and Ports, Turning Inward, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2006, at
A02, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/02/
AR2006030201702.html.
196. See Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005).
197. Rebecca Ulam Weiner, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: Private Military Men Patrol Iraq in
Constant Jeopardy of Stepping on Legal Landmines, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 25,
available
at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/
argument_weiner_janfeb06.msp
198. Larry Margasak, Update 2: Firm Failed to Protect U.S. Troops’ Water, FORBES, Mar. 16,
2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2006/03/16/ap2600881.html. See also Julianne
Donofrio, Did Halliburton Sell Dirty Water?, ABC News, Jan. 23, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/IraqCoverage/story?id=1533349.
199. Larry Margasak, Firm Failed to Protect U.S. Troops’ Water, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1731535.
200. Id.
201. An Oversight Hearing on Whether Halliburton Failed to Provide Clean Water to United
States Troops in Iraq: Hearing Before the Senate Democratic Policy Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2006)
(statement
by
Ben
Carter,
former
Halliburton
employee),
available
at
http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/hearings/hearing27/carter.pdf.
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approximately twice as contaminated as untreated Euphrates River
water, since KBR used wastewater that should have been returned to the
river.202 Pentagon auditors have found a $1 billion discrepancy in costs
submitted by Halliburton.203 Discontinuing its multibillion-dollar
contract with Halliburton, Army officials note that depending upon one
contractor puts the government in a vulnerable position. Future work
will be divided among three companies. A fourth company will assess
performance.204
Good governance involves accountability, transparency,
participation, consensus building, responsiveness, effectiveness,
efficiency, and equity.205 The rule of law component of good governance
calls for fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially by an
independent judiciary.206 Mindful of future as well as present needs of
society; good governance requires the full protection of human rights.207
The National Security Agency’s (NSA) presidentially-authorized
program of warrantless wiretapping208 and the CIA-run network of secret
202. Donofrio, supra note 198. See also Julian Borger, Halliburton accused over Iraq water
supplies,
GUARDIAN,
Jan.
24,
2006,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1693463,00.html (“‘The level of contamination was
roughly 2x the normal contamination of untreated water from the Euphrates river,’ said one email
dated July 15 2005 from William Granger, an employee of Halliburton’s subsidiary, KBR.”); Larry
Margasak, Workers Allege Halliburton Knew Their Water Was Foul, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at
A02,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/22/
AR2006012200853.html; Larry Margasak, Halliburton Cited in Iraq Contamination, ABC NEWS,
Jan 22, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1531615.
203. Renae Merle, Halliburton Allegations Are Sent to Justice Dept.: No-Bid Contracts In Iraq
Are
at
Issue,
WASH. POST,
Nov.
19,
2005,
at A15,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/18/AR2005111802503.html
(“Two former Halliburton workers have been charged with taking kickbacks while working for the
company in the Middle East. And Pentagon auditors have questioned more than $1 billion in costs
for the company’s work there.”); Griff Witte, Army to End Expansive, Exclusive Halliburton Deal:
Logistics Contract to Be Open for Bidding, WASH. POST, July 12, 2006, at A01, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/07/11/AR2006071101459.html?nav=r
ss_print/asection (“Government audits turned up more than $1 billion in questionable costs.”).
204. Witte, supra note 203, at A01.
205. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Human
Settlements, What is Good Governance?, http://www.unescap.org/huset/gg/governance.htm (last
visited Aug. 16, 2006).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. For a discussion of NSA wiretapping, see Eric Lichtblau, Administration Lays Out Legal
Case for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/19/politics/19cndnsa.html?ex=1295326800&en=2a39fd0e9ee78d
01&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. See also Adam Brookes, White House Defends Spying
Policy, BBC NEWS, Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4645412.stm;
Google defies US over Search Data, BBC NEWS,
Jan. 20, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4630694.stm.
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prisons have prompted a debate on who should define the parameters of
good governance.209
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
Liberal democracy consists of two important components: a liberal
notion of freeing the people protects individuals from tyranny and a
democratic notion of empowering people implements popular rule.210 As
Philippa Foot notes, some needs are universal: “[a]ll need affection, the
cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble. It
isn’t true to suppose that human beings can flourish without these
things . . . . Communities as well as individuals can live wisely or
unwisely.”211 Remedying the legacy of historical inequities requires a
commitment to supporting the cultural integrity of the myriad of
indigenous peoples around the world.212 Indigenous peoples have gained
the status as special subjects of concern in relation to the United
Nations.213 The General Assembly declared an international decade on
the rights of indigenous peoples.214 Indigenous communities within
states are not members of the United Nations but have been able to voice
some concerns by obtaining official consultative status with the UN
Economic and Social Council.215 Indigenous peoples have advanced
209. Dana Priest & Scott Higham, At Guantanamo, a Prison Within a Prison, WASH. POST,
Dec. 17, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59182004Dec16.html. See also Controversy Continues Regarding Detainees Held by the CIA, Renditions
to Other Countries, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 706 (2005); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050214fa_fact6;
Richard Norton-Taylor, Amnesty Demands Public Inquiry on Rendition Flights, GUARDIAN, April
5, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1746827,00.html; Dana Priest &
Walter Pincus, CIA, White House Defend Transfers of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,
2005, at A07, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A451192005Mar17.html.
210. Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Government Travel?, 6:3 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY
101, 102 (1995).
211. Michael J. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: A “Naturalist”
Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 995, 1063 (quoting Philippa Foot, Moral Relativism, in RELATIVISM:
COGNITIVE AND MORAL 164 (J. Meiland & M. Krausz eds., 1982).
212. S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples and International Law Issues, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 96, 96-97 (1998).
213. Id. at 96. Indigenous people have also gained special subjects of concern status with the
International Labour Organisation (“ILO”), Organization of American States (“OAS”) and other
international institutions. Id.
214. Id. at 97.
215. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees notes that:
15 organizations of indigenous peoples have consultative status with the United Nations
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Consultative status entitles them to attend and
contribute to a wide range of international and intergovernmental conferences. These
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historic sovereignty claims, treaty claims, minority claims, selfdetermination claims, and human rights claims.216 International human
rights based claims have provided indigenous communities the greatest
protection to date.217 The Convention Against Genocide recognizes that
all cultural groupings of people have a right to exist.218 The UN Charter
calls upon states to show “respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.”219 The widely ratified UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) provides that states
organizations are: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Asociación Kunas
Unidos por Nabguana, Four Directions Council, Grand Council of the Crees (of
Quebec), Indian Council of South America, Indian Law Resource Centre, Indigenous
World Association, International Indian Treaty Council, International Organization of
Indigenous Resource Development, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, National Aboriginal
and Islander Legal Services Secretariat, National Indian Youth Council, Saami Council,
Sejekto Cultural Association of Costa Rica, and World Council of Indigenous Peoples.
In addition, hundreds of representatives of other indigenous peoples and their
organizations participate in United Nations meetings, in particular those of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations. Non-governmental organizations with general human
rights interests actively contribute to work in the field of indigenous peoples’ rights, in
addition to supporting indigenous peoples’ causes.
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No.9 (Rev.1), The Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, July 1997, Introduction [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 9], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm.
216. Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 190
(2001).
217. S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and
Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 237, 241-42 (2005) [hereinafter Anaya, Realist Trend].
218. Article 2 of the Convention Against Genocide defines genocide as “acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,”
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277. See also S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: The
Move Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13, 20 (2004) [hereinafter
Anaya, Multicultural State].
219. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3. The U.N. Charter recognizes the right of self-determination
for all peoples and calls upon states to advance human rights without discriminating on the basis of
race, sex, language, or religion. Id. International and regional human rights instruments that address
non-discrimination and equality include: International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978); African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 26, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 58 (1982); Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N.
Doc. A/36/684 (1981); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Official
Rec., OEA/ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
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promote indigenous cultural identity, freedom from discrimination,
sustainable development, and effective participation.220
The United States ratified CERD in October 1994. Under its early
warning and urgent action procedure, the United Nations Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has called upon the United
States
to freeze any plans to privatize Western Shoshone ancestral lands for
transfer to multinational extractive industries and energy developer;
and to desist from all activities or plans concerning the ancestral lands
of Western Shoshone or in relation to their natural resources, which
were being carried out without consultation with and despite protests
of the Western Shoshone peoples.221

Nevada-based Western Shoshone tribal members and two residents
of Utah filed suit to prevent the detonation of a 700-ton ammonium
nitrate and fuel oil bomb at the Nevada Test Site.222 A mushroom cloud

220. UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), General
Recommendation XXIII: Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/51/misc 13/Rev 4, at ¶ 4 (1997)
[hereinafter CERD General Recommendation on Indigenous Peoples] calls upon states to:
(a) Recognize and respect indigenous distinct culture, history, language and way of life
as an enrichment of the State’s cultural identity and to promote its preservation;
(b) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples are free and equal in dignity and rights
and free from any discrimination, in particular that based on indigenous origin or
identity;
(c) Provide indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for a sustainable economic and
social development compatible with their cultural characteristics;
(d) Ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective
participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and
interests are taken without their informed consent;
(e) Ensure that indigenous communities can exercise their rights to practice and
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs and to preserve and to practice their
languages.
The UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination have recognized indigenous peoples’ rights, based upon the new international
standards. Respect for indigenous human rights increasingly impacts lending decisions of the
European Union, Inter-American Development Bank, and World Bank. International law that
recognizes indigenous rights also affects the executive and judicial system of states. See, e.g.,
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Supp. No. 18, at 30, U.N. Doc. A/49/18 (1994) (addressing Swedish legal provisions affecting
Saami land and hunting rights). See also Anaya, Multicultural State, supra note 220, at 18 n.23.
221. Press Release, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concludes Sixty-eighth Session (Mar. 10, 2006),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/D85D881B5C5CF007
C125712D007A1035?opendocument.
222. Ken Ritter, Indian Tribe, Downwinders: Stop Nev. Blast, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2006,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/20/
AR2006042002031.html.
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from bunker buster blasts developed to penetrate solid rock would
expose people in the region to radioactive fallout remaining after nuclear
weapons detonated from 1951 to 1992.223 Oxfam reports that this is the
first time that a UN committee has issued a full decision against United
States federal Indian law and policies.224
Prior to the creation of the United Nations, the Permanent Court of
International Justice described national minorities as distinct from the
majority “in race, language and religion.”225 This conception of
minorities has been broadened by such agreements as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),226 which recognizes
that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.”227 Article 27 of the ICCPR
provides, “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use
their own language.”228
International law recognizes the rights of peoples to internal selfdetermination and cultural integrity.229 For instance, the ICCPR
recognizes to “all peoples” the right of self-determination and the right
to freely pursue economic, social, and cultural development.230 The
International Labor Organization (“ILO”) Convention No. 169 on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples states that “governments shall have the

223. Id.
224. Press Release, Oxfam America, Western Shoshone Victorious at United Nations (Mar. 10,
2006),
available
at
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/press_releases/press_release.2006-0310.3507376169/?searchterm=Shoshone.
225. Steven Wheatley, National Minorities and the Emerging Human Rights to Political
Inclusion and Dialogue, 2:2 E. EUR. HUM. RTS REV. 123 (1997).
226. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978),
999
U.N.T.S.
171
(1978)
[hereinafter
ICCPR],
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
Id. art. 2(1).
227. Id. art. 1(1).
228. Id. art. 27.
229. Clinton, supra note 7, at 115-16.
230. ICCPR, supra note 227, art. 1. See also Clinton, supra note 7, at 115-16.
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responsibility for developing, with the participation of the
peoples
concerned, coordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of
these peoples and to guarantee respect for their integrity.”231 This
binding multilateral treaty is the foremost international confirmation of
indigenous rights to date,232 revising the ILO’s earlier Convention No.
107 assimilation policy.233 ILO Convention No. 169 recognizes the
aspirations of indigenous peoples to: “exercise control over their own
institutions, ways of life and economic development and to maintain and
develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework
of the States in which they lie.”234 Indigenous cultural integrity235 is
intertwined with land and resource rights.236 S. James Anaya points out:
Within the Western liberal frame adopted in the political and juridical
culture of the United States, indigenous peoples’ lands have been

231. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries, ILO Convention No. 169, art. 2(1), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382
(entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm. Article 3(1) provides: “[i]ndigenous and tribal peoples
shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without hindrance or
discrimination.” Id. art. 3(1).
232. ILO Convention No. 169 has impacted indigenous human rights struggles around the
world, most notably in Mexico. Implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) resulted in an effort to weaken Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, recognizing
collective land tenure. See Marco Palau, The Struggle for Dignity, Land, and Autonomy: the Rights
of Mexico’s Indigenous People a Decade After the Zapatista Revolt, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
427, 438-42 (2005). The indigenous peoples of Chiapas organized themselves into an armed
resistance group known as the Zapatistas. Their seizure of six Chiapas towns gained them global
recognition. National and international pressure forced the Mexican government to end its military
response and sign the 1995 Law for Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Dignified Peace in Chiapas. “Ley
para El Dialogo, La Conciliacion y La Paz Digna en Chiapas,” D.O., 11 de marzo de 1995,
http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/ijure/tcfed/188.htm?s= (last visited April 2, 2006). The Zapatistas’
concerns were seen in light of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169.
233. International Labour Organization, Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration
of Indigenous Populations and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in the Independent
Countries, ILO Convention No. 107, June 2, 1959, 107 I.L.O. 1957 [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 107].
234. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 231, at pmbl., par. 5. Article 7(1) of ILO Convention
No. 169 provides that:
The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process
of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and
the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible,
over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall
participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes
for national and regional development which may affect them directly.
Id. art. 7(1). See also Anaya, Multicultural State, supra note 218, at 23-24.
235. E.g., ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 231, art. 5 (“[T]he social, cultural, religious
and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected.”).
236. Id. pt. 2 (land).
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treated as fungible with cash.
In contemporary international law, by contrast, modern notions of
cultural integrity, non-discrimination, and self-determination join
property precepts in the affirmation of sui generis indigenous land and
resource rights, as evident in ILO Convention No. 169. 237

This convention calls upon states to recognize the unique value of
land and natural resources to cultural integrity.238 Such spatial references
as a place of origin are central to tribal religious practice and identity.239
Article 15 guarantees indigenous peoples rights “to participate in the
use, management and conservation” of their natural resources.240
Raymond Cross notes, “Indian peoples by custom, heritage, and
treaty bargain are highly immobile. Their lands represent their collective
entwinement with their spiritual, emotional, and economic lives.”241
Indigenous peoples have the right to retain their own customs and
institutions.242 The ILO Convention No. 169 provides that “the methods
customarily practiced by the peoples concerned for dealing with
offences committed by their members shall be respected.”243
Autonomous governance is fundamental to cultural development and
stewardship of natural resources.
International institutions are playing a role in strengthening
consensus regarding indigenous peoples’ rights. The United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Populations produced the draft of a UN
Declaration on the Indigenous Peoples, under the auspices of the UN
Commission on Human Rights.244 The Working Group has reviewed
237. Anaya, Multicultural State, supra note 218, at 38.
238. Article 13(1) of ILO Convention No. 169 provides: “[G]overnments shall respect the
special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship
with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in
particular the collective aspects of this relationship.” ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 231, art
13(1). See also Martin Wagner, The International Legal Rights of Indigenous Peoples Affected by
Natural Resource Exploitation: A Brief Case Study, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 491, 498
(2001).
239. Tsosie, supra note 58, at 283.
240. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 231, art. 15(1).
241. Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian
Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 508 (1998). Rebecca Tsosie points out
that biodiversity prospecting is another area in which value conflicts occur. Tsosie, supra note 58, at
317-18. Indigenous claims for protection of such sacred knowledge as desert resistant corn seed
stock face stiff economic pressure. Id.
242. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 231, art. 8(2).
243. Id. art. 9.
244. The UN Draft Declaration of Principles on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides
that, “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and
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national developments impacting indigenous human rights and has
established international human rights thresholds.245 A similar process is
underway with regard to a proposal for an American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.246 The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has developed a draft American Declaration, which is
under discussion within a working group of the Permanent Council of
the Organization of American States.247 United Nations Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues Chairperson Victoria Tauli-Corpuz calls
upon the Human Rights Council to make certain that indigenous issues
will be an integral part of its mandate.248 The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 300
million indigenous peoples in the world.249 There exists a great deal of
diversity among these indigenous communities. Benedict Kingsbury
notes that the UN draft Declaration inadequately addresses relationships
between tribes, states, and federal governments.250 Kingsbury calls for a
strengthening of cooperative relationships among indigenous and state
judicial systems,251 as well as a recognition of the individual rights of
non-members and dissenting members of indigenous communities.252

material relationship with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources which
they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.” Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 25, E.S.C. Res. 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., at 105,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994), reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 541 [hereinafter UN Draft
Declaration]. Non-governmental International conferences in 1977 and 1981, combined with a
United Nations study, prompted the Economic and Social Council to create the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (1982). “The Working Group has become one of the
largest United Nations forums in the field of human rights.” Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 215,
Introduction, Working Group on Indigenous Populations.
245. Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 215, Introduction, Working Group on Indigenous
Populations.
246. Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
95th Sess., 1333d mtg., pmbl., OEA/Ser/L/V/II.95 (1997) [hereinafter Proposed American
Declaration].
247. Anaya, Realist Trend, supra note 217, at 241. See also Proposed American Declaration,
supra note 246.
248. UN Forum on Indigenous Issues Looks to New Human Rights Council, UN NEWS SERV.,
May
25,
2006,
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18622&Cr=indigenous&Cr1.
249. Fact Sheet No. 9, supra note 215, Introduction.
250. Kingsbury, supra note 216, at 226-28.
251. Id. See also UN Draft Declaration, supra note 244. The UN Draft Declaration recognizes
rights by indigenous peoples to participate fully in the affairs of the state and strengthen separate
legal systems. Id. art. 4. See also id. arts. 8, 12-14, 19-21, 23.
252. Kingsbury, supra note 216, at 227-28.
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VII. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: THE MEANS ARE THE ENDS
How one asks for protection affects what kind of protection one
will receive. Language of tolerance minimizes criticism that can be
directed at a given group. On the other hand, such an approach runs the
risk of providing limited immunities rather than full equality and
participation. Inter-temporal resource misallocations occur when
politicians base decisions upon short-term outcomes at high discount
rates.253 They place little value on future harms.254 The economic arena
is no longer the nation-state. Rather, we now operate in a global market.
At the same time, we have consolidated power into microeconomic
units. Harold Laski noted that “demands of modern global economics
render the nation-state economically untenable as a discrete economic
unit.”255 Yet, there remains a mystique surrounding the concept of the
nation state.
Treaties between states historically have been limited to positive
obligations derived from specific agreements based on mutual benefit.
Often these treaties were honored for only as long as it was expedient to
do so. Yet, international cooperation is no longer restricted to such a
minimalist approach. Since any legal system’s ability to affect social
change is limited, however, relying on law’s omnipotence to replace
morals eventually leads to legal nihilism. Law merely provides a skeletal
framework for society. Without individual creativity and a sense of
genuine community such a skeleton can become an ominous presence
inspiring fear.
Bringing divergent political traditions together is an ambitious
challenge, the drafters of which must not lose sight of the need to
establish an identity that its members can embrace. New Zealand fishery
management illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of devolving
environmental decision-making to the private sector. Property rights
should not be designed to liberate industries from interacting with
communities. Implementing an individual transferable quotas system
must involve equitable allocation. This is best achieved through
provisions for public participation that create a level-playing field for
non-elite members of civil society. Otherwise, environmental
management will diverge from the larger public interest. Balancing

253. Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1495,
1515-16 (1999).
254. Id.
255. IAN WARD, THE MARGINS OF EUROPEAN LAW 27 (1996) (citing HAROLD LASKI,
LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE (rev. ed., Viking Press 1949) (1930)).
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access to information and process transparency with guarantees of
finality for permit holders is not an insurmountable challenge. Public
participation by civil society increases procedural legitimacy.
Meaningful consent requires governments to facilitate processes by
which members of the public analyze the appropriate level of
governmental intervention. While scientists can narrow the range of
technical uncertainty, ordinary individuals have the capacity to make
value judgments.
A. Equitable Allocation of Tradable Fishing Permits to the Maori
Individual transferable quotas have become a common management
tool for fisheries.256 Granting exclusive property rights within a closed
system provides perpetual harvesting rights.257 As a result, individual
transferable quotas reduce incentives for fishers to stay out in dangerous
weather conditions.258 Furthermore, environmental organizations and
governmental agencies can enter the market and retire permits by buying
individual transferable quotas if stocks are over-fished.259 New Zealand
has implemented rights-based management for the vast majority of its
commercial fisheries.260
The establishment of an individual transferable quotas system in
New Zealand was based on the assumption that fisheries were part of a
common property resource that was ultimately under government
control. This was not a valid assumption. The Maori people were able to
bring a property claim through the Waitangi Tribunal. The Maori noted
that they had not given up their fisheries rights guaranteed to them under
Article II of the Treaty of Waitangi.261 Negotiated in 1840 between
England and Maori tribal leaders, this treaty established exclusive Maori

256. Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the
Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 406-09. (1999).
257. See id. at 395.
258. Robert N. Stavins, Taking Fish to Market: Why Not Trade Fishing Rights the Way
Business Trades Pollution Credits?, FORBES, Apr. 28, 2003, available at
http://forbes.com/forbes/2003/0428/040.html.
259. Roger Bate, The Common Fisheries Policy: A Sinking Ship, WALL ST. J., June 2000,
available at http://www.environmentprobe.org/enviroprobe/evpress/0700wsj.html.
260. Robert Repetto, A New Approach to Managing Fisheries, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Fall
2001, available at http://www.issues.org/18.1/repetto.html.
261. The Treaty of Waitangi (TE TIRITI O WAITANGI) was entered into on Feb. 6, 1840. A
retranslation of the Maori text of the Treaty can be found in the judgment of New Zealand Maori
Council v. Att’y Gen., [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 662-63 (C.A.). The Treaty is also available at
http://www.govt.nz/en/aboutnz/?id=77737fd3275e394a8ed9d416a72591d0 (last visited Feb. 13,
2004).
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rights over fisheries.262 Before settlers came from Europe, fishing was
important to both local Maori diets and inter-tribal trade.263 In contrast,
fishing has not played an important role in the general New Zealand
economy until recently.264
Without documentation of landings, Maori fishing was deemed
informal. As a result, non-Maori fishers gained exclusive property rights
over New Zealand fish stocks based upon proven catch from the
previous three years.265 Efforts to facilitate responsible self-management
contravened the Treaty of Waitangi’s guarantee of Maori ownership of
New Zealand fisheries. Devolving responsibility for delivery of new
quota registry systems to the fishing industry resulted in a long legal
battle that left the Maori with ten percent of their original fishery rights.
As Richard Dawson notes:
The ultimate problem of legal-economic policy is the structuring of the
decision-making process itself. The supreme question is: who decides?
Who decides which interests are to count in situations of conflicting
wills. That is to say, who can create enforceable interests? Most if not
all conflicts over the Treaty of Waitangi have concerned the question
of ‘who decides?’ – especially in regard to the issue of ‘whose
interpretation is to count’.266

Claims to commercial fishing rights were settled by negotiation.
Significant controversy arose regarding the selection of Maori
262. Richard M. Dawson, The Genesis of the New Zealand Parliament’s Treaty of Waitangi
(Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act, 1992, 1 INT’L. J. WATER 80 (2000), available at
http://www.inderscience.com/search/index.php?action=record&rec_id=2054&prevQuery=&ps=10
&m=or.
263. In a submission to the Tribunal, citizen Huhana Morgan noted, “Our knowledge and skills
have been ignored, we are silently angry and extremely saddened at the loss of one of our major
resources. What was once the staple diet of the Southern people is now a luxury many of us cannot
afford.” Dawson, supra note 262 (quoting a submission to the Waitangi Tribunal by Huhana
Morgan, of Ngui Tahu).
264. Pyar Memon & Ross Cullen, Fishery Policies and their Impact on the New Zealand
Maori, 7 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 3 (1992):153-67. Refrigeration technology enabled New
Zealand to establish a lucrative meat and dairy export industry. The country became a grasslands
based economy. Until the 1970s fishing was primarily a small-scale enterprise. While there were
many small boats, they did not venture beyond inshore fisheries. In general, the industry did not
account for a large sector of employment or profitability in the economy. The 1970s marked a rapid
expansion of New Zealand’s fishing operations. The combination of Britain’s entry into the EC and
the OPEC oil shock caused New Zealand’s economy to suffer in the early 1970s. In an attempt to
bolster the economy, the government introduced a variety of ways to increase exports. These
initiatives included incentives to expand fishing.
265. Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled
Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 45, 59-60 (1999). See also Dawson, supra note 262.
266. Dawson, supra note 262.
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negotiators and their ability to bind the Maori people. The government
provided the capital for Maori to acquire a half share in New Zealand’s
largest fishing company.267 Ten percent of individual transferable quotas
were allocated to Maori. Combined with the shares acquired through the
fishing company, the Maori became the largest participant in the
commercial industry. In return the Maori agreed that all claims to
commercial fishing were extinguished.268
B. Impetus to Change Rules
The environmental debate is defused when government devolves
decision-making to the market. Decreasing the government’s role in
natural resource management takes away the forum in which conflicting
views can be discussed and policies challenged.269 Transferring the
protection of the environment from the public sphere to the marketplace
depoliticizes the decision-making process. When issues are brought back
into the public domain they are resolved pursuant to scientific expert
witnesses and narrow legal interpretations of sustainability. Social
dimensions of resource distribution are discounted in no small part due
to the manner in which industry can control the parameters of the
decision-making process. Corporations have greater resources at their
disposal to retain persuasive scientific experts, conduct research that
supports their position and present findings in an attractive way. New
Zealand has devolved much of the responsibility for fishery management
to industry. This has included scientific research on the health of fish
stocks. Privatizing fisheries through the individual transferable quotas
system has concentrated ownership. According to the New Zealand
Ministry for the Environment, the three largest fishing companies
controlled sixty percent of the total allowable catch by 1997.270 Duke
University notes that ten percent of the permit holders own eighty
percent of permits.271 Despite the imperative of establishing sustainable
267. Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992, 1992 S.N.Z. No. 121,
available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/browse_vw.asp?content-set=pal_statutes (Interim
Website Home for Statutes of New Zealand).
268. H.R. STANDING COMM. ON PRIMARY INDUSTRIES, RESOURCES AND RURAL AND
REGIONAL AFFAIRS, 38TH PARL., DEVOPMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND AGRICULTURE – REPORT OF A
VISIT TO NEW ZEALAND, PARLIAMENTARY PAPER 397/97, ch. 3.11 (1997) (Austl.) available at
http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/primind/newzeald/nzreport/nzindex.htm.
269. Maria Lee and Carolyn Abbot, The Usual Suspects? Public Participation Under the
Aarhus Convention, 66 M.L.R. 80, 103-05 (2003).
270. Tom Bührs, From Diffusion to Diffusion: the Roots and Effects of Environmental
Innovation in New Zealand Environmental Politics, 12 ENVTL. POL. 83, 94 (2003).
271. Stephanie Hunt, Daphne Pee & Tracy Parsons, Flopping Fisheries, at Individual
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fishing practices, management systems that lead to consolidated markets
often concentrate wealth and severely impact small-scale fishers.272 As
Katrina Smith notes:
Debates over environmental issues usually involve questions of
distribution. Problems such as deciding where to site noxious facilities,
how to share the costs of cleaning up pollution, and how to allocate
natural resources equitably all raise concerns over who will bear the
costs of using (or not using) natural resources. While science and
economics can outline efficient and effective solutions to technical
problems, the ultimate choice between possible solutions can only be
made after considering qualitative issues such as power, politics,
public opinion, tradition, and fairness.273

Public participation must be meaningful. Facilitating political
deliberation can inform the public of government decisions and make
public opinion known to policy-makers. Political sophistication is not a
Transferable/Fishing
Quotas,
para.
7
(2002),
available
at
http://www.biology.duke.edu/class/bio217/2002/fish/management.html.
272. Id.
273. Katrina Smith, Fairness In Water Quality: A Descriptive Approach, 4 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 85, 85 (1984). See also STEVEN YEARLEY & UNWIN HYMAN, The Authority of Science:
Knowledge, Truth and Reality, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & SOCIAL CHANGE (1988) (pointing out
the weaknesses in trying to divorce science from socially constructed forms of knowledge); Brendan
Gillespie, Dave Eva & Ron Johnston, Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and Great
Britain: The case of Aldrin/Dieldrin, in 9 SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 265 (1979), available at
http://sss.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/265 (discussing why the United States and British
policies diverged regarding the status of Aldrin/Dieldrin as a carcinogen). These two critiques by
Yearley and Gillespie provide a framework for understanding the arguments and inconsistencies of
anti-constructionist and constructionist theories. By analyzing what kind of knowledge science
gives we can conclude how much authority such information should receive. Anti-constructionist
contend that because science is based on facts directly found in nature science is uniquely true. The
Aldrin/Dieldrin case divided the United States and Britain because universal criterion could not be
agreed upon. As a result, policies were based on opposing paradigms. Britain based its findings on
traditional cause and effect toxicology, which subscribes to acceptable dosages within lethal limits.
In contrast, the United States used a newer branch of toxicology, which moves beyond relating
toxicity to dosage. The case was by no means divided simply because the American toxicologist,
Saffiotti, was a molecular biologist who believed in a trigger effect while the British toxicologist,
Barnes, believed in the traditional view of thresholds. Many cultural factors played a role in the
policy-making decisions of each country. One such non-scientific debate was the decision not to
discount mice as a viable test animal. The scientific grounds of the controversy were ignored
because it was too overwhelming to consider that the vast majority of products would have to be
taken off the market if mice were discredited. There is a lack of consensus both regarding what kind
of knowledge science provides and how deserving science is of authority. Many decisions depend
upon the branch of science used by the decision-maker, explaining why the United States banned
Aldrin/Dieldrin while Britain kept it on the market. Even if ideal distribution of funding and
resources were available, rarely are scientists given the time to determine findings. A continued
study of science and technology’s relation to society is needed to safeguard society against special
interest groups or simply overly hasty attempts at progress.
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prerequisite for rational political dialogue. Actual discourse enables
public participation. Political conversation builds skills unattainable by
merely instilling political knowledge. Deliberative democracy depends
upon a healthy public sphere, which in turn requires public space to
facilitate rational discourse. Deliberation legitimizes decisions by
exposing the decision-making process to a discussion among equal
citizens.274 Politically knowledgeable citizens have crystallized opinions
that enable them to express views in collective decision-making venues
more fluently than individuals with lower levels of education and
interest. While such factors as age and newspaper readership affect
political sophistication, conversation as opposed to sophistication
increases deliberative capability. Discourse enables people to form
articulate opinions. For deliberation to provide decision-makers with the
views of the people, there must be an even playing field. Discussions
foster equality only if everyone has an opportunity to be heard.275 In the
absence of equality, opinions that are voiced cannot be said to represent
public opinion.276
Beyond civic skills, time and money play a significant role in one’s
ability to participate. Possessing these resources increases both the
chances that an individual will take part and the likelihood that such
participation will make a difference. Psychological engagement varies
depending on peoples’ values, group affinity, interest in politics, and
feelings of efficacy.277 Discussion regarding equitable distribution loses
its public forum when regulatory control is transferred to the private
sector. Decision-making becomes de-politicized as dominant interests
are promoted as scientific expertise. Devolving environmental regulation
to industry moves issues out of the public sphere. This downplays
conflict since differences do not come to light through public debate.
This is not an adequate solution to the manner in which governments
have protected the environment. The fact that judges and scientific
expert witnesses are not elected officials combined with restricted access
to courts leaves the public with little recourse. People have a right to
participate in decisions that affect their social and physical
274. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge
for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 600 (1999).
275. David Dutwin, The Character of Deliberation: Equality, Argument, and the Formation of
Public Opinion, 15 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 239, 240 (2003).
276. Id.
277. Political efficacy is a person’s perception that he or she can affect change and that the
political system responds to his or her particular needs. See Dietram A. Scheuftie, Matthew C.
Nisbet & Dominique Brossard, Pathways to Political Participation? Religion, Communication
Contexts, and Mass Media, 15 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 300, 302-04 (2003).
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environment.278
C. The Århus Convention and the Human Right to a Clean Environment
Increasing the flow of information to and the thoughtful analysis by
ordinary citizens avoids policy stagnation in a rapidly changing world.
While scientists provide valuable technical expertise, civil society must
be consulted regarding such value judgments as the appropriate level of
governmental intervention. The Århus Convention has codified a human
right to a clean environment, granting citizens access to environmental
information, participation in decision-making in environmental matters,
and judicial redress.279 The Convention recognizes the need to protect
the environment for both present and future generations.280 Including
citizens in environmental protection increases the effectiveness of that
protection since people often have a deep interest and are affected by the
state of their surrounding environment.281 This rights-based approach
prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship, nationality, or
domicile. While the Convention is not focused on the private sector,
when environmental regulation has been devolved to privatized bodies,
these entities are covered under the definition of public authorities.282
Public authorities must generate and provide basic environmental
information, access to which will facilitate informed participation in
decision-making. By increasing government accountability and
transparency, better decisions can be reached. Having a stake in the
process should enhance people’s willingness to implement decisions.
Public authorities have both a passive responsibility to respond to
requests for information and an active responsibility to collect, update
and distribute information. Article 4 sets forth a presumption in favor of
278. Bührs, supra note 270, at 98.
279. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice regarding Environmental Matters (Århus Convention), June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M.
517
(1999)
(entered
into
force
Oct.
30,
2001),
available
at
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. The convention was negotiated among the
Member States of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). On June 25,
1998 the convention was adopted at a pan-European meeting of environment ministers in Århus,
Denmark. All of the member states of the European Union and the EU itself signed. The convention
entered into force on October 30, 2001. The convention and general information are available via
the UN/ECE Århus Convention website at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html (last visited
Mar. 28, 2004). Further information is available from the European Union Online website at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?paction.gettxt=gt&doc=MEMO/
03/210|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display= (last visited Mar. 28, 2004).
280. Århus Convention , supra note 279.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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access, leaving a finite list of exemptions that are to be interpreted
restrictively.283 Both individuals and NGOs may request environmental
information without proving that they are interested parties.284 The
Convention brings together human rights and environmental law. Access
to information is a prerequisite to public participation in environmental
decision-making.285 The Convention grants the public with a right to be
heard in the law making process and a right to seek judicial remedies
when there has been a breach of environmental law.286
VIII. CONCLUSION
Living sustainably depends upon our ability to find common
ground amidst an array of competing interests. Given the urgent need for
coordination to maintain peace and security, comity between
governments is essential. The United States has discovered that
legislating the assimilation of native communities into a national polity
neither reduces administrative complexity nor achieves meaningful
governance. Chippewa cultural heritage is interwoven with the harvest
of ancient wild rice. Pueblo ceremonial rights to clean water are equally
central to retaining cultural heritage. Alaska Natives and the Maori
fishermen of New Zealand have been induced to incorporate in order to
retain control over traditional natural resources. While the Clean Water
Act has succeeded in curbing the disposal of chemicals into North
American waterways, non-point source pollution remains as difficult to
control as the smuggling of illicit drugs. Who decides the parameters of
homeland security and the requisite degree of public oversight of private
entities? Cooperative tribal, state, federal, and international responses to
the meth crisis can address both environmental and human health.
Ensuring water quality and water availability remain core public
functions, the provision of which governments cannot disregard. An
important first step in this process is to address jurisdictional
uncertainty. Transparent, legitimate, and accountable governments are
the most likely to be able to achieve good governance and cooperate

283. Article 4(4) states that the “grounds for refusal shall be interpreted in a restrictive way,
taking into account the public interest served by disclosure and taking into account whether the
information requested relates to emissions into the environment.” 38 I.L.M. 517, 519-20.
284. Article 2(5) clarifies that “‘The public concerned’ means the public affected or likely to
be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this
definition, non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any
requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest.” Id. at 519.
285. Id. at 517.
286. Id. at 524.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol40/iss2/1

46

Burleson: Cooperation to Achieve Good Governance
BURLESON

2007]

3/30/2007 12:50:08 PM

COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE GOOD GOVERNANCE

253

with one another in international decision-making forums. Protecting
individuals and tribal integrity are not inherently mutually exclusive
goals. Cooperation involves time and trust. Governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and civil society must remain
committed to justice, respecting varying cultural approaches to conflict
resolution. Our strength is not in our ability to assimilate. It is in our
capacity to transcend co-existence to sustain genuine cooperation.
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